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Abstract
Bond market order ￿ ow contains information about future yield changes that is not
incorporated into the current yield curve. This paper documents that term structure
models that include interdealer order ￿ ow outperform traditional term structure models
and the random walk both in-sample and out-of-sample. A unique data set, including
customer trades and interdealer trades of individual dealers, enables the paper to explore
the sources of predictability in interdealer order ￿ ow. The results suggest that dealer skill
in acquiring and interpreting information can be one source. Predictability appears to be
related to dealer activity rather than to dealer size and customer base.
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The classical expectations hypothesis implies that forward rates can predict future interest
rates, but empirical studies suggest otherwise. Fama and Bliss (1987) and Campbell and
Shiller (1991) ￿nd that forward rates predict bond excess returns, a measure of the risk
premium which is assumed constant in the expectations hypothesis, rather than future
short rates. This is con￿rmed by Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) who conclude that bond
yields contain time-varying risk premia and that these can be predicted by a single forward
rate factor. Recent studies suggest that information beyond that contained in the yield
curve can predict bond yields. Ludvigson and Ng (2009) ￿nd that macroeconomic factors
have important forecasting power for bonds above the predictive power of forward rates.
Andersen and Benzoni (2010) conclude that bond market volatility cannot be predicted
by information in the current yield curve and suggest that the term structure modeling
framework should be extended to include macroeconomic and monetary policy variables.
The purpose of this paper is to explore whether bond market order ￿ ow, which can re￿ ect
macroeconomic information, has forecasting power for yield changes and if so, to identify
the sources of predictability.
Order ￿ ow is de￿ned as the number of buyer-initiated trades minus the number of
seller-initiated trades during a day and can re￿ ect private information about asset prices
held by traders.1 Private information can include interpretations of macroeconomic indi-
cators as well as dispersed private information related to market liquidity, hedging activity
and the perception of risk among market participants. In other words, order ￿ ow can con-
vey information of fundamental and non-fundamental character held by agents trading in
the market. Several market microstructure studies have documented a relationship be-
tween order ￿ ow and asset prices. Evans and Lyons (2002), Hasbrouck (1991) and Brandt
and Kavajecz (2004) ￿nd that order ￿ ow contains information about contemporaneous
changes in exchange rates, stock prices and bond yields, respectively. Evans and Lyons
(2005) show that foreign exchange market order ￿ ow also contains information about fu-
ture exchange rates. They document that exchange rate forecasts based on order ￿ ow
outperform forecasts based on macroeconomic variables and the random walk.
1Positive order ￿ ow indicates a net buying pressure and negative order ￿ ow indicates a net selling
pressure during a day.
2This paper makes three contributions. First, it introduces lagged bond market order
￿ ow as a new variable in a term structure model. Bond market order ￿ ow is separated into
three maturity groups according to the maturity of the bonds traded. Second, it employs
both aggregate and individual dealer order ￿ ow in the predictive regressions. Third, it
includes order ￿ ow from both tiers in the sovereign bond market; the customer market and
the interdealer market. The paper employs a unique data set from Norway including all
bond trades with dealer identities from September 1999 to September 2005. This facilitates
the separation of interdealer trades from customer trades both at the aggregate level and
the individual dealer level. The paper can therefore address questions that cannot be
addressed using other data sets such as GovPX, which contains US Treasury interdealer
trades, but does not include customer trades or dealer identities.2 Other frequently used
data sets contain customer trades from a speci￿c ￿nancial institution or from the one tier
bond futures market. These data sets are unable to capture dealer heterogeneity or the
dynamics between dealers and their customers.
One interesting topic, so far unexplored empirically due to a lack of data, is the sources
of predictive power in aggregate interdealer order ￿ ow. Two sources of predictability in
order ￿ ow are considered; informed customer trades and dealer skill. Dealer skill is de-
￿ned as dealer ability to acquire and process relevant information beyond the information
contained in the dealer￿ s customer trades. This could be interpretations of public infor-
mation, information from other market participants or information obtained by observing
and engaging in trades in the interdealer market. Thus, if the interdealer order ￿ ow of
an individual dealer has predictive power it could be either because she has the ability to
identify her informed customer trades or because she has the skill to acquire and interpret
other relevant public and private information. If the source of predictability is informed
customer trades, both the customer order ￿ ow and the interdealer order ￿ ow of a dealer
are expected to have predictive power. If the source of predictability is dealer skill, only
the interdealer order ￿ ow of a dealer is expected to have predictive power.
The predictive power of individual interdealer order ￿ ow can be related to the role
2According to Fleming and Remolona (1997) GovPX data includes best bid and o⁄ers, trade prices
and trade sizes and the aggregate volume of trading for all Treasury securities from ￿ve of the six major
primary dealers/interdealer brokers accounting for roughly two thirds of the interdealer market. Brandt
and Kavajecz (2004) ￿nd that this volume represents roughly 45 percent of the trading volume in the
secondary market for Treasury securities.
3of dealers in the price formation process. Are dealers passive intermediaries of customer
trades or are they actively collecting and trading on information? If dealers are passive
intermediaries their interdealer order ￿ ow is likely to be uninformed. Their customer or-
der ￿ ow can have predictive power if their customers on average are informed. If dealers
are active information collectors, by identifying informed customers or by acquiring infor-
mation from other sources, their interdealer order ￿ ow is likely to have predictive power.
While traditional market microstructure models, for example Glosten and Milgrom (1985)
and Kyle (1985), leave no room for active dealers, there is some empirical evidence that
dealers have an active role in the price formation process. Manaster and Mann (1996)
and Anand and Subrahmanyam (2008) ￿nd that dealers are not mere intermediaries of
customer trades, but actively seek and aggregate information in the markets for commod-
ity futures and stocks, respectively. Peiers (1997) and Sapp (2002) document that some
dealers in the foreign exchange market consistently incorporate new information into their
quotes before others. Unlike previous empirical studies this paper can investigate dealer
heterogeneity and the sources of predictability in interdealer order ￿ ow directly.
There are two sets of results in this study, the ￿rst is based on aggregate order ￿ ow
and the second is based on individual dealer order ￿ ow. The ￿rst set of results documents
that models including bond market order ￿ ow make better predictions than traditional
term structure models. Aggregate interdealer order ￿ ow has predictive power over and
above that of forward rates indicating that it contains information about future bond
prices that is not fully incorporated into the current yield curve. Term structure models
including order ￿ ow also outperform the random walk model. Lagged interdealer order
￿ ow forecasts changes in bond yields of maturities from one to ten years at both daily and
monthly horizons. For example, a one standard deviation increase in daily medium term
order ￿ ow, de￿ned as the order ￿ ow based on bonds with a remaining time to maturity
between 4 and 7 years, predicts a fall in the 3-year yield of 0.44 basis points the next
day. An increase in monthly medium term order ￿ ow of one standard deviation, predicts
a 5.86 basis point decrease in the 3-year yield in the following month. The fact that both
daily and monthly interdealer order ￿ ow have predictive power indicates that order ￿ ow
contains di⁄erent types of information and that it may take a month or more for some
types of information to become fully incorporated into bond prices.
4The second set of results suggests that the sources of predictive power in interdealer
order ￿ ow are both informed customer trades and dealer skill in acquiring and interpreting
relevant information. The results document that the interdealer order ￿ ow of some, but
not all, of the dealers have predictive power for future yield changes. At the daily horizon
the interdealer order ￿ ow of two of the four large dealers have predictive power along the
whole yield curve. While the customer order ￿ ow of one of these dealers also has predictive
power, the customer order ￿ ow of the other does not. This suggests that the main source
of predictability for the ￿rst dealer is customer trades while it is dealer skill for the second
dealer. At the monthly horizon the interdealer order ￿ ows of the same two dealers, and a
third large dealer, have predictive power. However, the customer order ￿ ows of these three
dealers have no forecasting ability, indicating that customer trades are not an important
source of predictability at the monthly horizon.
The results further indicate that the forecasting ability of individual interdealer order
￿ ow is related to whether dealers are passive intermediaries or active market participants
rather than to dealer size and customer base. The paper employs two measures of dealer
activity. The ￿rst is the value of a dealer￿ s active (initiated) interdealer trades over the
value of her customer trades. The second is the number of active interdealer trades relative
to the number of passive (initiated by another dealer) interdealer trades. Active dealers
are characterized by a high score on both measures while passive dealers are characterized
by a low share. When comparing the scores of the four large dealers in this study, the three
dealers with predictive interdealer order have relatively high scores while the last dealer
has a much lower score on both measures. This dealer has the largest customer base but
her interdealer order ￿ ow has no forecasting ability on either the daily or monthly horizon
indicating that this dealer is a passive, uninformed intermediary.
Bond yields can be decomposed into expected average future short interest rates and a
risk premium. To better understand the type of information contained in order ￿ ow, the
predictive power of order ￿ ow on both yield changes and bond excess returns is explored.
To preserve space the results for bond excess returns are not included in the paper, but
are available upon request. The results document that order ￿ ow has roughly the same
explanatory power for yield changes and excess returns, while forward rates are better
predictors of excess returns than of yield changes. These ￿ndings suggest that order ￿ ow
5predicts risk premia, but risk premia beyond, and perhaps di⁄erent from, those predicted
by forward rates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the related
literature. Section 3 describes the data set and trading conventions in the Norwegian
government bond market. Section 4 presents the theoretical background and econometric
framework. Sections 5 and 6 report the results based on aggregate interdealer order ￿ ow
in-sample and out-of-sample, respectively. Section 7 presents the in-sample and out-of-
sample results based on individual dealer order ￿ ow. Finally, section 8 concludes.
2 Related literature
This paper is related to several segments of the ￿nance literature; the market microstruc-
ture literature, the term structure literature, and the literature on asset return predictabil-
ity. The market microstructure literature has documented that order ￿ ow contains infor-
mation about asset prices. Studies on bond markets include Brandt and Kavajecz (2004)
who ￿nd that up to 26 percent of contemporaneous daily yield changes in the U.S. Treasury
market can be accounted for by interdealer order ￿ ow. Pasquariello and Vega (2007) show
that unanticipated order ￿ ow in US treasuries has a signi￿cant and permanent impact on
daily bond yield changes on news days as well as on no-news days.3 Valseth (2011) ￿nds
similar results from the Norwegian government bond market. This paper has a di⁄erent
approach by focusing on the role of order ￿ ow as a predictor of future yield changes.
The predictive power of currency market order ￿ ow is documented by Evans and Lyons
(2005). They ￿nd that models including order ￿ ow in foreign exchange markets have sig-
ni￿cant out-of-sample forecasting power for exchange rates and outperform both macro-
economic models and the random walk. Evans and Lyons (2008) document that order
￿ ow can forecast both the exchange rate and its underlying macroeconomic determinants.
The present study is related to Evans and Lyons (2005, 2008), but di⁄ers in several ways
besides investigating a di⁄erent asset market. First, it employs both interdealer order
3They de￿ne unanticipated order ￿ ow as the order ￿ ow over thirty minute intervals that are not ex-
plained by lagged thirty minute order ￿ ow or thirty minute quote revision. They use 19 lags which equals
a trading day. Unanticipated order ￿ ow is calculated by adding up the 19 error terms within each day.
6￿ ow and customer order ￿ ow. Second, it uses individual dealer order ￿ ow to investigate
possible sources of predictability. Third, it attempts to reveal whether the information
contained in order ￿ ow is related to bond risk premia by studying the predictive power
of order ￿ ow on both yield changes and excess returns. Fourth, while Evans and Lyons
(2005) use overlapping daily data at the monthly horizon but do not test for a possible
bias due to the persistence of overlapping observations, this paper addresses the potential
problem by employing non-overlapping data at the monthly forecasting horizon.
Asymmetrically informed dealers are discussed by Peiers (1997) and Sapp (2002). They
investigate the price setting behavior of dealers in the foreign exchange market. Both ￿nd
that some dealers are price leaders, which means that they incorporate new information
into their prices before others, after the central bank has intervened in the foreign exchange
market. While Peiers (1997) and Sapp (2002) investigate the role of dealer pricing behavior
in the transmission of information between dealers, this paper takes a di⁄erent approach by
investigating the role of di⁄erent dealers￿trading behavior in the price formation process.
Green (2004) ￿nds that the informational role of trading increases after macroeconomic
announcements, suggesting that the release of public information increases the information
asymmetry in the market. Menkveld et al. (2011) conclude that intermediaries in the one-
tier Treasury futures market rely on their customer order ￿ ow after macro announcements
to discover the full price impact. While Peiers (1997) and Sapp (2002) use individual
dealer quotes, Green (2004) uses aggregate interdealer order ￿ ow and Menkveld et al.
(2011) use dealer trades made on behalf of customers, this paper contributes by using
individual dealer order ￿ ow in both tiers of the bond market to better understand the
origins of predictability in interdealer order ￿ ow.
This paper is also related to the vast literature on the term structure of interest rates
and the expectations hypothesis. Fama and Bliss (1987) and Campbell and Shiller (1991)
￿nd that forward rates and yield spreads have little predictive power for future interest
rates. Instead they ￿nd that forward rates can predict bond excess returns, a measure of
the risk premium, and conclude that the bond risk premium varies over time and is pre-
dictable. Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) strengthen the evidence against the expectations
hypothesis by showing that a linear combination of all forward rates can predict bond risk
premia at one year horizons. Kessler and Scherer (2009) apply the Cochrane and Piazzesi
7(2005) model to international bond markets, and con￿rm that the model applies to these
markets also. This study builds on the above papers but adds order ￿ ow as a predictor
variable and has shorter forecasting horizons.
Recent studies highlight the importance of using information beyond that contained
in the yield curve. Ludvigson and Ng (2008) ￿nd that macroeconomic fundamentals can
forecast variation in bond excess returns. They perform a principal components analysis
of more than 100 macroeconomic indicators and ￿nd that lagged common factors have
signi￿cant forecasting power also out-of-sample. Andersen and Benzoni (2010) ￿nd that
bond market volatility cannot be predicted with information from the current yield curve
and indicate that macroeconomic and monetary policy variables in￿ uence the ￿ uctuations
in interest rates. Ilmanen (1995) shows that ￿nancial market variables can forecast excess
government bond returns in six countries. Cooper and Priestley (2008) document that the
output gap has predictive power for both stock excess returns and bond excess returns.
The present study di⁄ers from previous studies by using order ￿ ow, which can contain
both fundamental and non-fundamental information, as a predictor variable. Some of the
information re￿ ected in order ￿ ow can be related to the macroeconomic outlook, thus
supporting the ￿ndings of the above mentioned studies.
Finally, this paper is related to Goyal and Welch (2008) who reexamine the performance
of variables that have been suggested to be good predictors of the equity premium. They
￿nd that most of the models are unstable or even spurious and recommend that a predictor
variable is tested both in-sample and out-of-sample. They illustrate the performance of
a predictor variable over time by calculating a metric comparing the cumulative squared
prediction errors of the model including the predictive variable to that of the random
walk. This paper follows the recommendation by Goyal and Welch (2008) and modi￿es
their method to examine the out-of-sample predictive power of predictors of the bond risk
premium.
83 Data and trading environment
3.1 The secondary market for Norwegian government bonds
The secondary market for Norwegian government bonds is organized similarly to major
government bond markets. It is a two-tier market consisting of an interdealer market
and a customer market. Dealers in government bonds have to be members of the Oslo
Stock Exchange (OSE) and authorized for bond trading. Membership may be granted
to Norwegian and foreign investment ￿rms authorized to provide investment services in
Norway or in their country of origin. A majority of the dealers are primary dealers
appointed by the Central Bank. Typically, primary dealers are banks and brokerage ￿rms.
The number of primary dealers has varied between 5 and 8 during the sample period. In
order to secure a liquid and well functioning market, primary dealers are obliged to provide
￿rm bid and ask prices within a maximum spread for all benchmark bonds during market
opening hours from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. Other participants in the secondary market are
bond dealers that are not primary dealers and non-dealers referred to as customers. The
interdealer market is the market between dealers. All dealers are connected to the OSE
electronic trading system. Interdealer trades can thus be electronic trades or "over-the-
counter" trades.4 The customer market is the market between bond dealers and their
customers. Customers in general do not have access to the electronic trading system and
must execute their bond trades through dealers. Customers may be institutional investors,
commercial ￿rms and individuals.
The data set employed in this paper is unique in that it contains data making it
possible to distinguish trades in the two markets for each dealer. Customer trades and
interdealer trades can be separated by applying the identity of the buying and the selling
dealer. Transactions with di⁄erent buying and selling dealers are de￿ned as interdealer
trades, and transactions with the same buying and selling dealer are de￿ned as customer
trades. The interdealer market constitutes about 35 percent of the total market measured
in number of trades, and about 25 percent measured in value (NOK). Interdealer trades
in this study are on average around 22 million NOK, and customer trades are on average
4"Over-the-counter" trades are agreed on over the phone or any communication systems other than the
electronic order book.
9around 36 million NOK. All trades have to be registered in the OSE electronic trading
system within 5 minutes after they are agreed upon. The trades are normally visible to
other traders in the electronic order book shortly after the trade and at the latest by 4
p.m.
3.2 Data
The analysis in this paper is based on a data set that covers all trades in the Norwegian
government bond market from September 6, 1999 to September 30, 2005. The number of
bonds in the market varies between four and six benchmark bonds with a remaining time
to maturity between 1 and 11 years. The bonds are issued, and subsequently expanded, in
the primary market according to a pre-announced auction calendar. There are typically
six to eight bond auctions during a year and they are conducted as uniform price (Dutch)
auctions. Every other year a new 11 year bond is issued. The new bond will reach its full
size several years after it was ￿rst issued.
The data set includes all transactions in the benchmark bonds and the best bid and
ask prices submitted by the dealers. Each transaction includes date, time, price, amount,
and the identity of the buying and the selling dealer. A total of 66,650 transactions, both
electronic trades and over-the-counter trades, are included in the construction of daily and
monthly order ￿ ow data.
Order ￿ ow, the key explanatory variable in this study, is constructed by signing the
bond transactions according to the method of Lee and Ready (1991).5 The signed trades
are then aggregated into daily order ￿ ow. Daily order ￿ ow is de￿ned as the number of
buyer-initiated trades minus the number of seller-initiated trades during a day. Order ￿ ow
is divided into three maturity segments according to the remaining time to maturity of
the bonds being traded. Short term order ￿ ow includes bonds with a remaining time to
maturity from 1 to 4 years, medium term order ￿ ow includes bonds with a remaining time
to maturity greater than 4 years up to 7 years and long term order ￿ ow includes trades in
5Since the dealer identities do not indicate which dealer initiated the trade, the method of Lee and
Ready (1991) is used to sign the trades. Trades that are executed at a price less than the mid price are
classi￿ed as seller-initiated, and trades that are executed at a price higher than the mid price are classi￿ed
as buyer-initiated. For trades executed at the mid price, the tick rule is used. This rule implies that if the
price is higher than the previous transaction price (an uptick) it is classi￿ed as a buy. If the price is lower
(a downtick) it is classi￿ed as a sell. If it is unchanged (a zero uptick) the rule is applied to the price that
preceded it.
10bonds with a remaining time to maturity greater than 7 years. Since long bonds gradually
increase in size some bonds included in long term order ￿ ow can be somewhat less liquid
than the bonds included in the other two categories.
This study employs zero coupon yields and forward rates for Norwegian government
bonds.6 These yields are calculated from end-of-day prices of government bonds and
government bills using the Nelson-Siegel algorithm. The zero-coupon bond yields are used
to calculate daily and monthly yield changes and excess returns of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 10 year
bonds. One month forward rates 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 10 years ahead, are used to calculate
forward spreads and principal components of forward rates.
3.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 Panel A and Panel B show the decomposition of forward rates into principal
components. Panel A presents the six factors extracted from the one month forward rates
maturing in 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 10 years. The panel shows that the ￿rst factor explains
92.8 percent of total variance, whereas the second and third factors explain 6.6 and 0.5
percent respectively. This implies that the ￿rst three components explain 99.9 percent of
the variation in forward rates. Instead of using forward rates in the predictive regressions,
the three ￿rst principal components are used. Panel B shows the loadings of the three
factors on the forward rates. The ￿rst factor loads about equally on all forward rates.
This makes it comparable to the "level" factor described by Litterman and Scheinkman
(1991). The second and third principal components of forward rates correspond to the
"slope" and "curvature" factors.7
This study uses both daily data and monthly data. To preserve space only descriptive
statistics based on daily data are presented. Table 2 Panel A shows that daily yield changes
are slightly negative on average. The decline in interest rates is related to the monetary
policy during the sample period. The Norwegian Central Bank cut the key interest rate
from 7 percent in December 2002 to 1.75 percent in 2004 in response to an in￿ ation level
below target. The one month rate is therefore the most volatile rate with a standard error
6Zero coupon yields and forward rates are kindly provided by Nordea Markets.
7Litterman and Scheinkman (1991) extract the common factors in Treasury returns and ￿nd that the
variation in returns on all Treasury ￿xed income securities can be explained by the three ￿rst factors named
level, steepness and curvature.
11of 7 percent. Yields on 2, 3, 4 and 5 year bonds are more volatile than 1 and 10 year
yields. The persistence, measured by the AR(1) coe¢ cient, appears to be relatively low
for daily yield changes. It should be noted, however, that it is considerably higher at the
very short end of the yield curve than at the long end.
The panel further shows that interdealer order ￿ ow for all three maturity segments on
average have a net selling pressure over the sample period. However, there are distinct
di⁄erences. Medium term order ￿ ow has the lowest average selling pressure, the lowest
standard error and by far the lowest persistence. Long term order ￿ ow appears to be the
most volatile variable, whereas the short term order ￿ ow is the most persistent variable.
Finally, Panel A shows that the principal components of forward rates and the Fama-
Bliss forward spreads are very persistent on a daily basis. The AR(1) coe¢ cients are in
excess of 99 percent for all series, except for the third principal component. The ￿rst
principal component of forward rates is clearly more volatile than the two other principal
components. The average value and the standard error of the forward spreads increase
with the maturity of the forward rates, which is expected as the forward spread is de￿ned
as the forward rate minus a short term interest rate. This paper uses the one month rate
as the short term interest rate.
Table 2 Panel B presents the correlations between the predictive variables. It appears
that short, medium and long term interdealer order ￿ ows are positively correlated with a
correlation around 20 percent at the daily horizon. These relatively low levels of correlation
imply that multicollinearity is not a problem at the daily horizon. The correlation between
short and medium term interdealer order ￿ ow is higher at the monthly than at the daily
frequency. However, multicollinearity does not appear to be a problem at the monthly
horizon as the order ￿ ow variables are statistically signi￿cant in the in-sample predictions.
4 Theoretical background and econometric framework
4.1 Market microstructure
While traditional term structure models assume that asset prices instantaneously re￿ ect all
new information, market microstructure theory focuses on the process of price formation
over time. According to O￿ Hara (2003) the price formation process, in which asset prices
12adjust to full information prices, do not occur instantaneously, but evolves in markets over
time. Lyons (2001) describes how new information is embedded into asset prices through
a direct channel and an indirect channel. Through the direct channel public information
is embedded into prices instantaneously. Through the indirect channel, also referred to as
price discovery, information is gradually incorporated into prices through trading activ-
ity. Order ￿ ow contains private information which is re￿ ected in asset prices over time.
Dealers observe the order ￿ ow, infer private information, update their expectations and
set prices accordingly. Private information may include heterogeneous interpretations of
public information as well as dispersed information related to liquidity, hedging demands
and investor risk preferences.
For bond markets, the main implication of the di⁄erences between the traditional asset
pricing literature and the market microstructure literature is how to interpret the yield
curve. According to the traditional view all relevant information is incorporated into the
current yield curve, but according to the microstructure view this is not necessarily so.
Since the process of price formation takes time, the yield curve will not completely re￿ ect
all available information at any point in time. The assumption that private information
becomes incorporated into yields over time suggests that a variable re￿ ecting private infor-
mation has potential as a predictor of future yield changes. Studies on the predictability of
order ￿ ow in other asset markets indicate that bond market order ￿ ow can have predictive
ability for bond yields. In this paper, aggregate interdealer order ￿ ow, individual dealer
interdealer order ￿ ow, and individual dealer customer order ￿ ow are used as predictor
variables for yield changes. As order ￿ ow can contain di⁄erent types of information rele-
vant for future yield changes over shorter or longer periods, the predictions are conducted
both at the daily and the monthly horizon.
4.2 The classical term structure model adapted to short horizon fore-
casts
The analysis in this paper is based on a simple term structure model widely used to test the
expectations hypothesis. The classical expectations hypothesis constitutes the foundation
of the literature on interest rate predictability and is described for example in Cochrane
(2001). It states that bond yields are expected values of average future short term interest
13rates and a constant risk premium. This implies that forward rates can predict future
interest rate changes. However, traditional term structure models produce poor forecasts
of interest rate changes, especially at short horizons. Fama and Bliss (1987) and Campbell
and Shiller (1991) reject the expectations hypothesis by documenting that forward rates
have little predictive power for future interest rates. Instead they ￿nd that forward rates
predict the excess return of a bond which is a proxy for the bond risk premium. Cochrane
and Piazzesi (2005) con￿rm these ￿ndings by showing that a linear combination of forward
rates have strong forecasting power for excess returns on all bonds. These results indicate
that bond yields contain time-varying risk premia and that these premia are predictable.
Time-varying bond risk premia also imply that yield changes re￿ ect either changes in
expected future short rates or changes in the risk premium. This means that if order ￿ ow
predicts yield changes, it can predict changes in future short rates or changes in the risk
premium. In an attempt to determine this we investigate the predictive power of order
￿ ow on both yield changes and bond excess returns. To preserve space only the results for
yield changes are presented in the paper, but the results for excess returns are available
upon request.
The term structure models used in previous studies are adapted to shorter horizons
to ￿t the nature of the data used in this study. Whereas Fama and Bliss (1987) and
Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) analyze forecasting horizons of one to four years, this paper
uses forecasting horizons of one day and twenty days. The twenty day horizon is referred
to as the monthly horizon. Daily and monthly yield changes of zero coupon bonds with
1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 10 years to maturity are predicted by the models presented below. Since
the forecasting horizons are short relative to the maturity of the bonds, the yield changes
are estimated under the assumption that the remaining time to maturity of the bond is
approximately the same at the beginning and at the end of the forecasting period. It is
thus assumed that N years￿1 day t N years and N years￿1 month t N years: Yield
changes are calculated according to
dy
(N years)
t+1 = y
(N years)
t+1 ￿ y
(N years)
t : (1)
where y
(N)
t is the log yield of a N year zero-coupon bond at day t or month t and dy
(N years)
t+1
14is the one-period change. Equation (1) shows that daily (or monthly) yield changes are
calculated using the same maturity yield.
Fama and Bliss (1987) use the forward spread to test the expectations hypothesis. The
forward spread is de￿ned as
FSN
t ￿ f
(N!N+1)
t ￿ y
(1m)
t ; (2)
where FSN
t is the forward spread at the N year horizon, f
(N!N+1)
t is the forward rate
quoted at time t for the one period interest rate from period N to period N+1, and y
(1m)
t
is the one month zero rate. Equation (2) states that the forward spread is measured as
the one period forward rate starting at time N minus today￿ s one period rate.
In order to investigate the predictive power of order ￿ ow while controlling for tradi-
tional term structure variables, ￿ve models are used in the in-sample predictions. Two
models, a) and b), are simple term structure models including the Fama-Bliss maturity
dependent forward spread de￿ned in Equation (2) and the ￿rst three principal components
of forward rates respectively. One model, c), is based on lagged order ￿ ow only. The last
two models, d) and e), include both order ￿ ow and the term structure variables. The
daily analysis is based on 1505 observations covering the period from September 1999 to
September 2005. The ￿rst model, model a), uses the Fama-Bliss forward spread as the
only predictor variable,
dy
(N years)
t+1 = ￿0 + ￿1FSN
t + ￿t+1; (3)
where dy
(N years)
t+1 is the change in the N-year zero yield from day t to day t+1, ￿0 is a
constant, FSN
t is the N year forward spread at time t and "t+1 is the error term. The
second model, model b), is related to Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) and uses the principal
components of forward rates as explanatory variables,
dy
(N years)
t+1 = ￿0 +
3 X
k=1
￿
k
2Fk
t + et+1; (4)
where k = 1; 2; 3 and F1
t is the ￿rst principal component, F2
t is the second principal
component and F3
t is the third principal component of forward rates. Model b) is also
15used in the out-of-sample analysis in order to isolate the predictive power of forward rates.
The third model, model c), uses lagged order ￿ ow only,
dy
(N years)
t+1 = ￿0 + ￿S
3OFS
t + ￿M
3 OFM
t + ￿L
3OFL
t + !t+1; (5)
where OFS refers to short term order ￿ ow, OFM refers to medium term order ￿ ow, and
OFL refers to long term order ￿ ow. Model c) is also used in the out-of-sample analysis in
order to isolate the predictive power of order ￿ ow. Finally, the fourth and ￿fth models,
model d) and model e), include both forward rates and order ￿ ow as predictive variables,
dy
(N years)
t+1 = ￿0 + ￿1FSN
t + ￿S
3OFS
t + ￿M
3 OFM
t + ￿L
3OFL
t + ￿t+1; (6)
dy
(N years)
t+1 = ￿0 +
3 X
k=1
￿
k
2Fk
t + ￿S
3OFS
t + ￿M
3 OFM
t + ￿L
3OFL
t + ￿t+1: (7)
Model d), presented in Equation (6), includes the forward spread and order ￿ ow as pre-
dictive variables. Model e), presented in Equation (7), includes the ￿rst three principal
components of forward rates and the three order ￿ ow groups.
The ￿ve regression models presented in equations (3) to (7), are applied for each
yield maturity, ￿rst to daily data then to monthly data. Recent studies, for example
Boudoukh, Richardson and Whitelaw (2008), have shown that long horizon forecasts based
on overlapping observations of highly persistent variables may lead to spurious results. In
order to avoid some of the possible bias due to the high persistence of monthly order ￿ ow
based on overlapping observations, this study uses non-overlapping monthly observations.
Monthly order ￿ ow is constructed by aggregating daily order ￿ ow over 20 day periods.
The principal components are based on monthly forward rates. The ￿ve models presented
above are also used for the monthly predictions of yield changes and excess returns.
5 In-sample results based on aggregate order ￿ ow
The in-sample results based on aggregate interdealer order ￿ ow can be summarized in
four main points. First, order ￿ ow can predict daily and monthly yield changes. This
indicates that order ￿ ow can contain di⁄erent types of information, both non-fundamental
16information and fundamental information of short or somewhat longer duration. Second,
order ￿ ow has predictive power in the presence of the forward spread and the ￿rst three
principal components of forward rates. This implies that bond market order ￿ ow contains
information about future yield changes that is not yet incorporated into the yield curve.
Third, order ￿ ow has predictive power across all maturities but tend to be stronger at the
short end of the yield curve. This suggests that the information re￿ ected in order ￿ ow
can be most relevant for the short end of yield curve. Fourth, order ￿ ow of all duration
groups contains information about future yields and medium term order ￿ ow, including
trades in bonds with 4 to 7 years to maturity, has the strongest predictive power. These
￿ndings are consistent with the market microstructure view that the adjustment of prices
to new information does not occur instantaneously, but is incorporated into prices over
time through order ￿ ow.
5.1 Daily predictions
Table 3 displays the results of the in-sample predictions of yield changes at the daily
horizon. The predictions are based on models a) to e) which are presented in equations
(3) to (7). The ￿rst two models test the predictive power of traditional term structure
variables. Model a), which has the Fama-Bliss forward spread as the only predictive
variable, does not have any predictive power for daily yield changes. The forward spread
has no signi￿cant coe¢ cients except for the 1-year yield change. Also model b), which
includes the ￿rst three principal components of forward rates, has little predictive power.
The ￿rst and second principal components have no signi￿cant coe¢ cients for yields of any
maturity. The third principal component of forward rates is signi￿cant for 10-year yield
changes only.
Model c) is the pure order ￿ ow model. The table shows that short, medium or long
term order ￿ ow has signi￿cant predictive power for yield changes of all maturities. The
predictive power of order ￿ ow is somewhat higher at the short end than at the long end of
the yield curve with adjusted R2s varying from 2.9 to 1.0 percent. Medium term order ￿ ow
has the most signi￿cant predictive power both economically and statistically for all yields
except for the 10-year yield. An increase in medium term order ￿ ow of one standard
deviation (3.7 trades) today will, all other equal, reduce the 3-year yield by 0.44 basis
17points tomorrow, corresponding to 1,2 percentage points on an annual basis. For 10-year
yield changes, only long term interdealer order ￿ ow has signi￿cant forecasting power.
Model d) includes both the forward spread and order ￿ ow as predictive variables. The
results in Table 3 show that order ￿ ow has signi￿cant predictive power in the presence of
the Fama-Bliss maturity speci￿c forward spread. The size and signi￿cance of the order
￿ ow coe¢ cients appear to be unchanged from the pure order ￿ ow model when including
the forward spread. The results of model e), which includes the three principal components
of forward rates and the three order ￿ ow groups, con￿rm the ￿ndings of model d). Order
￿ ow remains signi￿cant when adding forward rates in the predictive regressions. The R2s
of the model for the di⁄erent maturities vary between 2.8 and 1.2 percent. In all, the
results from this model indicate that order ￿ ow predicts future yield changes and that
the information in order ￿ ow is independent of the information imbedded in the current
yield curve. However, the low R2s imply that it can be di¢ cult to use this information
pro￿tably when taking transaction costs into consideration, but this is beyond the scope
of this paper.
5.2 Monthly predictions
Table 4 displays the results of the in-sample predictions of monthly yield changes. The
monthly predictions are based on models a) to e) presented in subsection 4.4 using non-
overlapping monthly data.8 The results of model a), which has the forward spread as the
only predictive variable, reveal the same pattern as the corresponding daily model. For
all yields except the 1-year yield, the forward spread has no signi￿cant predictive power.
Model b), which includes the ￿rst three principal components of forward rates, has higher
forecasting power at the monthly horizon than at the daily horizon. The third principal
component is statistically signi￿cant across all yields except for the 10-year yield. Model
c), which includes order ￿ ow only, shows that monthly order ￿ ow explains a substantial
part of monthly yield changes, with an adjusted R2 of between 6 and 17 percent across all
yields. These in-sample results are in line with Evans and Lyons (2005) who ￿nd that the
predictive power of lagged order ￿ ow increases with the horizon when looking at exchange
8Because of the relatively small sample of non-overlapping monthly data, the results are controlled by
performing monthly predictions based on overlapping data. The results of the two methods give similar
results indicating that there is no small sample bias.
18rates. The predictive power of order ￿ ow is higher at the short end than at the long end
of the yield curve, which is in line with the results at the daily horizon.
At the monthly horizon medium term order ￿ ow has signi￿cant forecasting power
across all yields, whereas long term order ￿ ow has no signi￿cant coe¢ cients along the
yield curve. Short term order ￿ ow has predictive power for 1 to 3 year yields. An increase
in medium term order ￿ ow of one standard deviation will decrease the yield of the 3-year
bond with 5.86 basis points, corresponding to 0.7 percentage points on an annual basis,
in the following month. The monthly e⁄ect is smaller than the daily e⁄ect. This could
indicate that a substantial part, but not all, of the predictive power in order ￿ ow is based
on short-lived private information. Model d), which includes both the forward spread and
order ￿ ow, does not improve the forecasting power relative to model c), which includes
order ￿ ow only. This con￿rms that order ￿ ow has independent predictive power, and that
the forward spread is a poor predictor of yield changes both at the monthly and daily
horizon. Model e), combining the principal components of forward rates and order ￿ ow,
outperforms both model b) and model c) across all yields except for the 10-year yield,
with adjusted R2s increasing from 11.5 percent for the 5-year yield to 18.4 percent for the
1-year yield. This shows that both lagged order ￿ ow and forward rates have predictive
power at the monthly horizon.
6 Out-of-sample results based on aggregate order ￿ ow
The main ￿nding in this section is that the out-of-sample results to a large extent con￿rm
the in-sample results and document that interdealer order ￿ ow is a robust predictor of yield
changes. The method in Goyal and Welch (2008) is employed to evaluate the out-of-sample
performance of order ￿ ow and forward rates. The stability of a predictive variable is tested
by comparing its out-of-sample forecasts over time to a benchmark model. The benchmark
model of Goyal and Welch (2008) uses the historic average of the equity premium as the
prediction for the next period. In this paper the benchmark model uses the historic average
of changes in the bond yield. This is a version of the random walk model (RW) and can
be written as
dy
(N years)
t+1 = c + ￿t+1; (8)
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(N years)
t+1 is the one period N year yield change, c is a constant and ￿t+1 is the
error term. Equation (8) states that the RW forecast depends on the historic average of
yield changes up to period t.
To evaluate the predictive power of order ￿ ow and forward rates predictions based on
these variables are compared to the predictions of the RW. These comparisons are made
separately for order ￿ ow and principal components of forward rates. The two models, the
order ￿ ow model and the pure term structure model, are referred to as the alternative
model when compared to the RW. If a variable has no predictive power in-sample, there
is no reason to test the variable out-of-sample using the same data set. Consequently only
variables which have predictive power in-sample are included in the models compared to
the RW. To compare the out-of-sample performance of the alternative model with the
RW, the mean squared forecasting errors (MSE) of the recursive forecasts from the two
models are calculated. To test whether the MSE of the order ￿ ow model is signi￿cantly
smaller than the MSE of the RW, the McCracken (2007) MSE-F test is employed. This
test statistic tests the null hypothesis that the constant yield change model has a MSE
that is less than, or equal to that of the time varying yield change model. The alternative
hypothesis is that the time-varying model has a lower MSE. The test statistic is
MSE ￿ F = (T ￿ h + 1) ￿ (
MSER ￿ MSEU
MSEU
); (9)
where T is the number of observations in the sample, h is the horizon, MSER is the mean
squared forecast error of the random walk and MSEU is the mean squared forecast error
of the alternative model being tested. Equation (9) de￿nes the test statistic as the ratio
of the di⁄erence in the MSE of the model being evaluated and the MSE of the random
walk over the MSE of the alternative model times the number of observations.9 Critical
values of this non-standard test are provided in Clark and McCracken (2005).
In order to check that the predictive power of a variable is not due to a special event
or time period, Goyal and Welch (2008) monitor the predictive power of the alternative
model relative to the benchmark over the whole sample period. They do this by illustrating
graphically the cumulative squared prediction errors of the RW model minus the squared
9Since the horizon is either one day or one month, and the monthly data are non-overlapping, (T ￿h+1)
will always be equal to the number of observations in the sample.
20prediction errors of the alternative model. In periods when this metric increases, the
alternative model predicts better, in periods when it decreases, it predicts worse than the
random walk. The same method is employed in this paper to illustrate the performance
of order ￿ ow and forward rates relative to the RW.
6.1 Daily predictions
Table 5 displays the results of the out-of-sample predictions of yield changes at the daily
frequency. The recursive forecasts cover the period from September 2000 to September
2005. The table compares the out-of-sample predictive power of alternative models includ-
ing order ￿ ow or forward rates to the RW. The alternative models only contain variables
that are signi￿cant in-sample. As a result of this, there are di⁄erent speci￿cations for the
alternative models at each maturity. The ￿rst column in Table 5 lists the maturity of the
bonds. The second column displays the variables included in the alternative model. The
third column displays the ratio of the mean squared errors (MSE) between the alternative
model and the RW. The McCracken test statistic is shown in the fourth column. The
table documents that the order ￿ ow model outperforms the RW model for all maturities.
The MSE ratios are all below 1, and the MSE-F test statistics are highly signi￿cant. For
1 to 5 year bonds only order ￿ ow variables were signi￿cant in the in-sample predictions.
Thus, in the out-of-sample predictions only order ￿ ows are included. For predictions of
the 2-year yield, we see that the model including short term and medium term lagged
order ￿ ow clearly outperforms the RW. The MSE-ratio of 0.98 indicates that the average
prediction error of the order ￿ ow model is smaller than that of the RW model. Also, the
MSE-F test statistic of 22.88 is highly signi￿cant.
Figure 1 illustrates the performance of the order ￿ ow model including short and
medium term order ￿ ow versus the RW in predicting daily 2-year yield changes over time.
The positive slope indicates that the accumulated MSE of the order ￿ ow model is smaller
than the accumulated MSE of the RW over the period September 2000 to September 2005.
The ￿gure shows that the order ￿ ow model did especially well in the fall of 2001 following
the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Also, in the spring of 2004, when the easing of monetary policy
in Norway came to an end, the order ￿ ow model did much better than the RW model. An
increasing curve over the whole period indicates that the order ￿ ow model predicts better
21than the RW model over time and implies that the results are not due to a one-time event.
The pure term structure model is tested for the 10-year maturity only. The second
and third principal components of forward rates are signi￿cant in-sample and included
in the out-of-sample term structure model. The MSE-F test statistic is 2.57 for the term
structure model compared to 16.45 for the order ￿ ow model at this maturity. With a MSE
ratio of 1.00 for the term structure model and 0.99 for the order ￿ ow model at the 10-year
maturity the results clearly indicate that the order ￿ ow model outperforms both the term
structure model and the RW along the whole yield curve.
6.2 Monthly predictions
Table 6 presents the results at the monthly horizon. The recursive forecasts are based on
monthly, non-overlapping data and cover the period from August 2001 to September 2005.
The table compares the out-of-sample predictive power of the order ￿ ow model and the
simple term structure model to the RW. As for the daily predictions, there are di⁄erent
speci￿cations for the alternative models at each maturity since the alternative models
contain variables that are signi￿cant in-sample only. The table shows that the order
￿ ow model clearly outperforms the RW in predicting monthly yield changes along the
whole yield curve. The pure term structure model also outperforms the RW in forecasting
changes in the 2, 3, 4 and 5-year yields. However, lower MSE-ratios and higher MSE-F test
statistics indicate that order ￿ ow variables are better predictors than forward rates. While
the MSE-ratios for the order ￿ ow models are in the range 0.87 to 0.93, the MSE-ratios for
the forward rates are in the range 0.95 to 1.0.
Figure 2 illustrates the performance of the order ￿ ow model and the pure term structure
model in predicting monthly changes in the 2-year yield versus the RW over time. The
order ￿ ow model includes short and medium term order ￿ ow. The positive slope indicates
that the accumulated MSE of the order ￿ ow model is smaller than the accumulated MSE
of the RW over the period September 2001 to September 2005. The ￿gure shows that
the order ￿ ow model did especially well from 2001 to 2003. The term structure model
includes the third principal component of forward rates only. The negative slope in 2002
indicates that the pure term structure model in some periods performs worse than the RW
model. The di⁄erence in the slopes for the order ￿ ow model and the pure term structure
22model documents that order ￿ ow outperforms forward rates as a predictive variable. This
indicates that order ￿ ow contains more information about future monthly yield changes
than the current yield curve.
7 The source of predictability - individual dealers
The results from the previous section document that aggregate interdealer order ￿ ow has
predictive power for yield changes at daily and monthly horizons. This section investigates
two possible sources of predictive power in interdealer order ￿ ow. The ￿rst is informed
customer trades and the second is dealer skill in collecting and processing other relevant
information. The unique data set used in this study, including customer trades and in-
terdealer trades of individual dealers, enables the direct identi￿cation of the two sources.
If both the interdealer and customer order ￿ ow of a dealer can predict yield changes, in-
formed customer trades are the likely source of information. If only the interdealer order
￿ ow of a dealer can predict yield changes, dealer skill is a likely source of information.
Seven dealers, representing about 85 percent of the trades in the data set, are included
in this part of the analysis.10 These seven dealers are banks and brokerage houses who
have been trading in government bonds throughout the whole sample period, many of
them as primary dealers. In order to investigate and compare the predictive power of the
order ￿ ow of the seven dealers, the following model is employed for each dealer and each
yield maturity at the daily and monthly horizons:
dy
(N years)
t+1 = ￿0 +
3 X
k=1
￿
k
2Fk
t +
L X
j=S
￿
j
3OF
j
i;t +
L X
j=S
￿
j
4COF
j
i;t + "t+1 (10)
where i = 1;2;3;4;5;6;7 identi￿es the seven dealers. ￿0 is a constant, Fk
t is the kth
principal component of forward rates where k = 1;2;3: OF
j
i;t is the interdealer order ￿ ow
of dealer i where j = S;M;L is short, medium and long term order ￿ ow, respectively.
COF
j
i;t denotes the customer order ￿ ow of dealer i at the di⁄erent maturities. N denotes
the yield maturity where N = 1;2;3;4;5;10 years. Equation (10) shows that the term
structure model used in this study includes lagged values of short, medium and long term
10The order ￿ ow of dealers who are not present in the market for a substantial part of the sample period
and dealers who only sporadically traded, are not included in this section.
23interdealer order ￿ ow and customer order ￿ ow for each dealer in addition to the three
forward rate factors.
After running the in-sample predictions based on the model in Equation (10), out-of-
sample predictions are run with the variables that are signi￿cant in-sample. To interpret
the results, two assumptions are made. First, if the interdealer order ￿ ow of an individual
dealer has predictive power, the dealer is considered informed. She could be informed
either because she has the ability to identify her informed customer trades or because
she has the skill to collect and interpret other available public and private information.
Second, if the interdealer order ￿ ow of an individual dealer has no predictive power, the
dealer is considered uninformed. However, her customer order ￿ ow could still have some
predictive power. If this is the case, her customers are on average informed. Finally, if
neither the interdealer order ￿ ow nor the customer order ￿ ow of a dealer have predictive
power, her customers are on average uninformed.
If a dealer is informed and the source of predictability is informed customer trades,
both her customer order ￿ ow and her interdealer order ￿ ow are expected to have predictive
power. The assumption is that dealers will utilize the private information extracted from
informed customer trades by trading in the interdealer market in the same direction. If an
informed customer buys bonds from Dealer A, Dealer A infers that bonds are undervalued
and she will initiate a buy trade from Dealer B. The interdealer order ￿ ow of Dealer A
will thus re￿ ect informed customer trades and both her interdealer and customer order
￿ ow should have predictive power. If a dealer is informed and the source of predictability
is dealer skill, only her interdealer order ￿ ow is expected to have predictive power. Dealer
skill is de￿ned as the skill in acquiring and interpreting information from other sources
than the dealer￿ s customer base. This includes extracting information about future yield
changes from macroeconomic indicators, other public information, or from other dealers.
7.1 Dealer characteristics
To investigate the informational di⁄erences between dealers, three dealer characteristics
are compared. These are size, customer base and dealer activity. Size is measured as a
dealer￿ s total market share in the customer market and the interdealer market. The market
share in the interdealer market is measured as the share of initiated trades. The customer
24base is measured as a dealer￿ s market share in the customer market. Dealer activity is
measured by two ratios. First, as the value of a dealer￿ s initiated interdealer trades over
the value of her customer trades. Second, as the number of initiated interdealer trades,
referred to as active trades, relative to the number of interdealer trades initiated by other
dealers, referred to as passive trades. A high ratio characterizes an active dealer and a
low ratio a passive dealer.
Dealer activity can indicate whether a dealer is informed or not. A dealer initiating
a trade is considered impatient as she chooses to accept the current bid or o⁄er price
in order to make sure that the transaction takes place immediately.11 A dealer who is
impatient is likely to possess private information that she wants to utilize before other
dealers learn about it.12 A high share of initiated interdealer trades relative to customer
trades and passive interdealer trades may thus indicate that a dealer has information about
future yields acquired through informed customer trades or through skill in collecting and
interpreting other information. Conversely, a low share of initiated interdealer trades may
indicate that a dealer does not possess private information.
Table 7 Panel A and Panel B present the characteristics of the seven dealers. The
measures in Panel A are based on the value of trades in NOK while the measures in Panel
B are based on the number of trades of each dealer. In Panel A the dealers are listed
according to size in Column 1 starting with the largest dealer. The total market share
of each dealer is displayed in the second column. There are four large dealers, Dealer 1
to Dealer 4, with market shares ranging from 17 to 24 percent, constituting 85 percent
of the market. Of the remaining three dealers Dealer 5 is a medium size dealer, while
Dealer 6 and Dealer 7 are small dealers. The third column shows the size of each dealer￿ s
customer base measured as their market share in the customer market. The four large
dealers also have the largest customer bases. If customer trades are an important source
of predictability, these four dealers should be the best predictors, especially Dealer 1 and
Dealer 2 with a customer market share of around 25 percent each. The fourth column
in Panel A displays the ￿rst measure of dealer activity. Among the four large dealers it
11Correspondingly, a dealer who is placing a limit order can be considered more patient as she is more
concerned about transacting to the "right" price than to make sure that the trade actually will take place.
12This is in line with the ￿ndings of Osler (2009) in the foreign Exchange market.
25varies between 19 and 42 percent.13 If the relative number of initiated interdealer trades
indicates whether a dealer is informed, one would expect the order ￿ ow of dealers with a
high ratio to predict better than the order ￿ ow of dealers with a low ratio. One of the large
dealers, Dealer 2, di⁄ers substantially from the others by displaying low dealer activity.
This can indicate that Dealer 2 is a passive dealer.
Table 7 Panel B displays the total number of trades entered into by each dealer sorted
by active interdealer trades, passive interdealer trades and customer trades. As in Panel
A, the ￿rst column lists the dealers according to size. The second column shows the
number of active interdealer trades as a percentage of the total number of trades by each
dealer. The second column shows the number of passive interdealer trades as a percentage
of the total number of trades by each dealer. The third column shows the number of
customer trades as a percentage of the total number of trades by each dealer. The second
measure of dealer activity is the ratio of active to passive interdealer trades, but is not
shown explicitly. The table shows that Dealer 1 has a high ratio and Dealer 2 a low ratio.
Dealer 3 and Dealer 4 have ratios in between, but close to Dealer 1. The medium and
small dealers appear to be active dealers.
7.2 Results based on individual dealer order ￿ ow
The ￿ndings based on individual dealer order ￿ ow suggest that dealer skill in collecting
and interpreting relevant information is an important source of predictability in addition
to informed customer trades. The results document that dealers are heterogeneous and
that some dealers have forecasting ability at both daily and monthly horizons. The results
further indicate that the predictive power of order ￿ ow is not related to dealer size or
customer base, but rather to dealer activity. At the daily horizon both customer trades
and dealer skill appear to be important sources of information. At the monthly horizon
customer order ￿ ow is not signi￿cant out-of-sample for the informed dealers, indicating
that dealer skill is the main source of predictability at this horizon. Among the four
large dealers Dealer 2 has the largest customer base but her interdealer order ￿ ow has
no forecasting ability on either the daily or monthly horizon. Also, Dealer 2 has a much
13One very small dealer has a ratio of more than 400 percent indicating a very small customer base and
a lot of proprietary interdealer trading.
26lower score on the activity measures than the others. However, at the monthly horizon,
the customer order ￿ ow of Dealer 2 has some predictive power. This suggests that Dealer
2 has some informed customers, but is unable to identify these customers, which is in line
with the de￿nition of an uninformed passive intermediary. The ￿ndings thus con￿rm our
expectations that active dealers possess private information about future yield changes that
is re￿ ected in their interdealer order ￿ ow while passive dealers have no such information.
7.2.1 In-sample results
The in-sample results for each dealer are based on the model in Equation (10) and pre-
sented in Table 8 to Table 11. Tables 8 and 9 display the results for daily yield changes.
Table 8 includes 1 to 3 year yield changes and Table 9 includes 4 to 10 year yield changes.
The results show that the predictive power varies substantially between dealers, also be-
tween dealers of equal size. The order ￿ ow of Dealer 1, which is among the four largest
dealers, has the strongest predictive power. The predictive power of Dealer 1 order ￿ ow,
which is mainly due to short and medium term interdealer order ￿ ow, varies between 2.2
and 1.3 percent at the daily horizon. It should be noted that also the medium term cus-
tomer order ￿ ow of Dealer 1 has signi￿cant forecasting power for 2 to 5 year yield changes,
indicating that informed customer trades can be an important source of information in
interdealer order ￿ ow. At the long end of the yield curve the long term interdealer and
customer order ￿ ow of Dealer 1 has signi￿cant forecasting power.
The order ￿ ow of Dealer 4, who is another large dealer with a large customer base, has
the second strongest predictive power. The predictive power of Dealer 4 order ￿ ow is due
to long term interdealer order ￿ ow and the explanatory power varies between 0.4 and 1.2
percent and is highest for 10 year yield changes. It should be noted that the customer order
￿ ows of Dealer 4 are insigni￿cant for all maturities at the daily horizon. This suggests
that dealer skill is the source of predictability for this dealer. Also, the medium term
interdealer order ￿ ow of Dealer 5, which is a medium size dealer, has predictive power for
1 to 4 year yield changes. The customer order ￿ ow with corresponding maturity has no
predictive power. Table 7 Panel B shows that this dealer has a much higher share of active
interdealer trades than passive interdealer trades. This points to Dealer 5 as an informed,
active dealer who initiates trades to bene￿t from her private information which is due to
27her skill in collecting and processing relevant information.
The interdealer order ￿ ows of Dealer 2, Dealer 3, Dealer 6 and Dealer 7 have no
predictive power at the daily horizon for maturities less than 10 years. The short term
customer order ￿ ow of Dealer 2 has some predictive power for 1 and 2 year yield changes.
The results for this dealer are consistent with her low scores on the dealer activity measures.
Dealer 2 appear to be a passive intermediary who is uninformed but has customers who
on average are informed about yield changes at the short end of the yield curve.
Tables 10 and 11 display the results for monthly yield changes. Table 10 includes 1
to 3 year yield changes and Table 11 includes 4 to 10 year yield changes. The results
are based on the model in Equation (10) with monthly data for each dealer. The three
forward factors are included in the models for the individual dealers and the third principal
component has some predictive power for 2 to 5 year yields at the monthly horizon. Dealer
1 appears to be the best predictor at the monthly horizon also. The short and medium
term interdealer order ￿ ow and short term customer order ￿ ow of Dealer 1 explain from
9.5 to 13.3 percent of the next month changes in 1 to 10 year yields. Dealer 3 is the second
best predictor at the monthly horizon. The short and medium term interdealer order ￿ ow,
and long term customer order ￿ ow for the longer maturities, of Dealer 3 explain from 1.1
to 9.3 percent of monthly yield changes. Dealer 4￿ s short term interdealer order ￿ ow has
predictive power from 1.9 to 5.1 percent and is strongest at the long end of the yield curve.
Dealer 2￿ s short term interdealer and medium term customer order ￿ ow have predictive
power for monthly yield changes from 3.6 to 7.6 percent in the in-sample predictions.
Dealer 5￿ s short term interdealer order ￿ ow has predictive power at the mid segment of
the yield curve. The small dealers have little predictive power at the monthly horizon.
The results at the monthly horizon indicate that some dealers possess private information
about future yield changes at the monthly horizon as well.
7.2.2 Out-of-sample results
Table 12 and Table 13 display the out-of-sample results at the daily and monthly horizon,
respectively. As in the previous section, only variables that are signi￿cant in-sample are
included. To separate the e⁄ects of interdealer and customer order ￿ ow, these order ￿ ow
variables are tested separately against the RW. Table 12 reveals that the lagged interdealer
28order ￿ ow of Dealer 1 has the strongest out-of-sample predictive power at the daily horizon.
The MSE ratios are well below 1 and the MSE-F test statistic is signi￿cant at the 1 percent
level for all yield maturities. Both short and medium interdealer order ￿ ow and medium
term customer order ￿ ow can predict out-of-sample. Figure 3 illustrates the predictive
power of the order ￿ ow of Dealer 1 for daily 3 year yield changes. The solid line shows
the performance of the interdealer order ￿ ow model of Dealer 1 against the RW and the
dotted line shows the performance of the customer order ￿ ow model. The ￿gure shows
that both models outperform the RW and that interdealer order ￿ ow has the strongest
predictive power. This suggests that informed customer order ￿ ow is an important source
of information for this dealer, in line with the assumptions outline above. It further
suggests that Dealer 1 use her ability to identify informed customers from her customer
base, as her interdealer order ￿ ow is more informative than her customer order ￿ ow.
The table further shows that the interdealer order ￿ ow of Dealer 4 has out-of-sample
predictive power for daily yield changes along the whole yield curve. For 10 year yields the
long term interdealer order ￿ ow of Dealer 4 produces the best out-of-sample predictions.
However, her customer order ￿ ow has no out-of-sample predictability. Figure 4 illustrates
the predictive power of Dealer 4 order ￿ ow for daily 3 year yield changes. The solid line
shows the performance of the long term interdealer order ￿ ow of Dealer 4 against the
RW and the dotted line shows the performance of the long term customer order ￿ ow.
The ￿gure shows that while the interdealer order ￿ ow model clearly outperforms the RW
the customer order ￿ ow model does not. This suggests that the source of predictability
of Dealer 4 is something other than customer trades which in this paper is referred to
as dealer skill in acquiring and processing relevant information. Also, the medium term
interdealer order ￿ ow of Dealer 5 has out-of-sample predictive power for 1 - 5 year yield
changes. As Dealer 5￿ s customer order ￿ ow has no out-of-sample predictability, the source
of predictability appears to be dealer skill for this dealer also.
The interdealer order ￿ ows of Dealer 2, Dealer 3, Dealer 6 and Dealer 7 have no out-
of-sample predictive power at the daily horizon. The customer order ￿ ow of Dealer 2 and
Dealer 3 can predict at the very short end of the yield curve, but the MSE ratios are
1 indicating that the customer order ￿ ow models of these dealers are not substantially
better than the RW. The results indicate that only two of the seven dealers, Dealer 1 and
29Dealer 4, possess information about next day yields. Figure 5 illustrates the di⁄erence in
the predictive power of the order ￿ ow of an informed large dealer and an uninformed large
dealer for daily 3 year yield changes. The ￿gure shows the performance of the Dealer 1
short and medium term interdealer order ￿ ow model against the RW (solid line) and the
performance of the Dealer 2 short and medium term interdealer order ￿ ow model against
the RW (dotted line). The performance measure for Dealer 1 is an upward sloping curve
over the period as a whole. This means that the model based on Dealer 1 interdealer
order ￿ ow outperforms the RW. The measure for Dealer 2 initially falls and then remains
constant for the rest of the period. This indicates that the model based on Dealer 2
interdealer order ￿ ow is outperformed by the RW. Figure 5 clearly illustrates that while
the order ￿ ow of Dealer 1 contains information about next day yield changes, the order
￿ ow of Dealer 2 does not. Table 7 Panel A shows that while Dealer 1 and Dealer 2 are both
large dealers with a large customer base, each with a 25 percent total market share and
a 25 percent customer market share, they score very di⁄erently on the activity measure.
Dealer 1 has a high score, characterizing an active dealer, and Dealer 2 has a low score,
characterizing a passive dealer. This indicates that the predictive power of interdealer
order ￿ ow is related to dealer activity rather than to customer base.
Table 13 displays the out-of-sample results at the monthly horizon. The interdealer
order ￿ ow of the large dealers, except Dealer 2, have out-of-sample predictive power. The
medium term interdealer order ￿ ow of Dealer 1 is the best predictor for monthly yield
changes. The MSE ratios of this model are close to 0.90 and the MSE-F test statistics are
signi￿cant at the 1 percent level. However, the short term customer order ￿ ow that was
signi￿cant in-sample has no out-of-sample predictive power. Also the short and medium
term interdealer order ￿ ow of Dealer 3, which has no predictive power at the daily horizon,
has out-of-sample predictive power for 1 to 4 year yield changes. Finally, the short term
order ￿ ow of Dealer 4 has signi￿cant out-of-sample predictive power along the whole yield
curve, especially at the long end. For 10 year yield changes the monthly long term customer
order ￿ ow of Dealer 4 also has some predictive power.
The interdealer order ￿ ow of Dealer 2 has out-of-sample no predictive power at the
monthly horizon. This demonstrates how important it is to examine the out-of-sample
predictability for a variable even if it is signi￿cant in-sample. However, the medium term
30customer order ￿ ow has some predictive power. Table 13 shows that the MSE-F test
statistics are signi￿cant at the 10 percent level. The short term interdealer order ￿ ow
Dealer 5 has predictive power for 1 to 3 year monthly yield changes. The order ￿ ow of the
two small dealers have no predictive power at the monthly horizon.
The results of Dealer 1, 3 and 4 suggest that they are informed dealers as their inter-
dealer order ￿ ow can predict monthly yield changes. This is consistent with the relatively
high scores of these dealers on the measures of dealer activity displayed in Table 7. As
their customer order ￿ ow has little or no predictive power at the monthly horizon the
results in this paper indicate that their source of information for monthly yield changes to
a large extent is dealer skill. The results for Dealer 2 are in line with the results expected
for an uninformed dealer who has customers that on average are informed. This is also
consistent with the low scores of Dealer 2 on the measures of dealer activity in the inter-
dealer market. A low score indicates that the dealer is a passive intermediary and thus
uninformed about future yield changes.
8 Conclusion
This paper makes three contributions. First, it includes bond market order ￿ ow as a
predictive variable in a term structure model. The results document that lagged interdealer
order ￿ ow has signi￿cant forecasting ability for yield changes beyond the predictive power
of forward rates. This implies that order ￿ ow contains information about future yield
changes that is not yet incorporated into the yield curve. The information in order ￿ ow
can be of fundamental or non-fundamental character and the results are thus in line with
Ludvigson and Ng (2009) who ￿nd that macroeconomic factors have forecasting power for
bonds. Second, the paper explores dealer heterogeneity. The results show that the order
￿ ow of some dealers can predict next day or next month yield changes, while the order
￿ ow of other dealers have no predictive power. This ￿nding is contrary to the assumption
in many market microstructure models, for example Glosten and Milgrom (1985), that
dealers (market makers) are homogenous with access to the same information. However,
it is in line with the price leadership e⁄ect documented by Peiers (1997) and Sapp (2002).
Predictability appears to be related to whether the dealer is passive or active in the
31interdealer market and not to dealer size and customer base.
The third contribution of this paper is to investigate whether dealer skill can be a source
of predictability in interdealer order ￿ ow. Traditional microstructure models implicitly
assume that informed customer trades is the only source of private information for a dealer.
Through a unique data set, including customer trades and interdealer trades of individual
dealers, this paper can directly measure whether the customer order ￿ ow of a dealer has
predictive power. If this is the case, we conclude that informed customer trades is the
source of predictability. If not, dealer skill in acquiring and interpreting relevant public
and private information can be a source. The results show that both informed customer
trades and dealer skill can be sources of predictability. This is consistent with Anand and
Subrahmanyam (2008) who ￿nd that dealers actively seek and aggregate information in
the markets, Green (2004) who document that interdealer trading increases after macro
news, and with Menkveld et al. (2011) who conclude that dealers rely on their customer
order ￿ ow after macro announcements to discover the full price impact.
Order ￿ ow also predicts bond excess returns. Order ￿ ow has roughly the same predic-
tive power for excess returns and yield changes when controlling for the e⁄ect of forward
rates. The results for bond excess returns are not included here, but available upon re-
quest. Taken together, the ￿ndings in this paper suggest that order ￿ ow predicts bond risk
premia, but risk premia beyond, and perhaps di⁄erent from, those predicted by forward
rates.
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35Table 1
Panel A: Principal components analysis of forward rates
The table displays the principal components of the one-month forward rates
1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 10 years ahead for the period September 1999 to September
2005. The ￿rst and second columns show the components and their value
ranked according to importance. The third column shows how much each
component explains of the total variation in forward rates. The fourth column
shows the cumulative e⁄ect and displays that the three ￿rst components explain
99,9 percent of the variation in forward rates. The ￿fth column reports the
persistence of the components measured by the ￿rst order autocorrelation.
Principal Value Proportion Cumulative AR(1)
component proportion
F1 5.569 0.928 0.928 0.997
F2 0.398 0.066 0.994 0.991
F3 0.030 0.005 0.999 0.892
F4 0.004 0.001 1.000 0.893
F5 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.881
F6 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.876
Panel B: Loadings of principal components of forward rates
The table presents the loadings of the ￿rst three principal components
extracted from the six forward rates. The ￿rst component loads about equally
on all rates and is positive, and corresponds to the level factor described by
Litterman and Scheinkman (1991). The second and third principal components
are similar to the slope and curvature factors.
F1 F2 F3
f
(1 year!1 year+1m)
t 0.388 0.630 0.403
f
(2 years!2 years+1m)
t 0.410 0.391 -0.046
f
(3 years!3 years+1m)
t 0.422 0.074 -0.347
f
(4 years!4 years+1m)
t 0.420 -0.189 -0.390
f
(5 years!5 years+1m)
t 0.412 -0.355 -0.258
f
(10 years!10 years+1m)
t 0.396 -0.532 0.705
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Panel A: Descriptive statistics for daily bond market and order
￿ ow variables
The table presents the number of observations and descriptive statistics
for daily yield changes in 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 10 year zero coupon bonds, short,
medium and long term aggregate interdealer order ￿ ow, the three ￿rst princi-
pal components of forward rates, and the Fama-Bliss forward spread over the
period September 1999 to September 2005. The last column displays the ￿rst
order autocorrelation for the variables.
Series obs mean std.dev. minimum maximum AR(1)
dy1 1504 -0.002 0.044 -0.37 0.25 0.156
dy2 1504 -0.002 0.052 -0.46 0.31 0.139
dy3 1504 -0.002 0.053 -0.49 0.29 0.107
dy4 1504 -0.002 0.052 -0.46 0.29 0.087
dy5 1504 -0.002 0.050 -0.42 0.29 0.082
dy10 1504 -0.002 0.046 -0.24 0.21 0.095
OFS 1504 -0.75 3.77 -27 22 0.154
OFM 1504 -0.17 3.69 -26 28 0.066
OFL 1504 -1.30 4.46 -34 20 0.113
F1 1504 -0.00086 2.36 -5.16 3.76 0.997
F2 1504 0.00024 0.63 -1.44 1.37 0.991
F3 1504 0.00002 0.17 -0.91 0.95 0.892
fwd spread1 1504 0.030 0.75 -2.08 1.52 0.990
fwd spread2 1504 0.252 1.18 -1.90 2.62 0.997
fwd spread3 1504 0.480 1.48 -1.80 3.43 0.998
fwd spread4 1504 0.640 1.66 -1.84 3.91 0.999
fwd spread5 1504 0.740 1.76 -1.86 4.21 0.999
fwd spread10 1504 0.875 1.85 -1.94 4.45 0.998
Panel B: Unconditional correlations daily data
The table presents the unconditional correlations of the order ￿ ow variables
and the three ￿rst principal components of forward rates on a daily basis. The
order ￿ ow variables include short, medium and long term aggregate interdealer
order ￿ ow.
OFS OFM OFL
OFS 1.000
OFM 0.241 1.000
OFL 0.190 0.235 1.000
F1 -0.093 -0.006 -0.087
F2 -0.033 -0.025 0.041
F3 0.064 0.029 0.054
37Table 3
In-sample predictions of daily yield changes
The table displays the results of the in-sample predictions of yield changes
at a daily horizon based on models a), b), c), d) and e) for the period September
1999 to September 2005, where dy
(i y)
t+1 is the daily yield change of the i year
bond , FSt is the forward spread, F1t;F2t and F3t are the ￿rst three principal
components of forward rates, and OFS
t , OFM
t and OFL
t are short, medium
and long order ￿ ow. Coe¢ cients are multiplied with 100 and in bold when
signi￿cant at the 10 percent level. * indicates signi￿cance at the 5 percent
level or better.
38FSt F1t F2t F3t OFS
t OFM
t OFL
t Adj:R2
dy
(1 y)
t+1 a 0:58￿
(3:02)
0:008
b 0:00
(0:53)
0:00
(1:51)
￿0:01
(￿0:64)
0:001
c ￿0:09￿
(￿2:05)
￿0:13￿
(￿3:86)
￿0:05
(￿1:54)
0:029
d 0:54￿
(2:79)
￿0:08
(￿1:78)
￿0:13￿
(￿3:94)
￿0:06
(￿1:86)
0:036
e 0:00
(0:05)
0:00
(1:49)
￿0:00
(￿0:28)
￿0:09￿
(￿1:97)
￿0:13￿
(￿3:79)
￿0:05
(￿1:59)
0:028
dy
(2 y)
t+1 a 0:12
(0:96)
0:000
b ￿0:00
(￿0:06)
0:00
(0:66)
0:00
(0:38)
0:000
c ￿0:09
(￿1:74)
￿0:13￿
(￿2:98)
￿0:05
(￿1:62)
0:020
d 0:11
(0:94)
￿0:09
(￿1:71)
￿0:13￿
(￿2:93)
￿0:06
(￿1:64)
0:019
e ￿0:00
(￿0:56)
0:00
(0:60)
0:01
(0:76)
￿0:09
(￿1:76)
￿0:13￿
(￿2:95)
￿0:06
(￿1:73)
0:018
dy
(3 y)
t+1 a 0:02
(0:19)
0:000
b ￿0:00
(￿0:23)
0:00
(0:52)
0:01
(1:20)
0:000
c ￿0:07
(￿1:57)
￿0:12￿
(￿2:75)
￿0:05
(￿1:32)
0:014
d 0:02
(0:25)
￿0:07
(￿1:31)
￿0:12￿
(￿2:53)
￿0:05
(￿1:56)
0:013
e ￿0:00
(￿0:70)
0:00
(0:48)
0:01
(1:62)
￿0:07
(￿1:39)
￿0:12￿
(￿2:53)
￿0:05
(￿1:74)
0:014
dy
(4 y)
t+1 a ￿0:01
(￿0:11)
0:000
b ￿0:00
(￿0:28)
0:00
(0:62)
0:01
(1:61)
0:001
c ￿0:04
(￿0:87)
￿0:12￿
(￿2:33)
￿0:05
(￿1:77)
0:011
d ￿0:00
(￿0:02)
￿0:04
(￿0:87)
￿0:12￿
(￿2:33)
￿0:05
(￿1:75)
0:011
e ￿0:00
(￿0:65)
0:00
(0:61)
0:02
(1:87)
￿0:05
(￿0:97)
￿0:12￿
(￿2:33)
￿0:06￿
(￿1:98)
0:013
dy
(5 y)
t+1 a ￿0:02
(￿0:28)
0:000
b ￿0:00
(￿0:23)
0:00
(0:80)
0:01
(1:48)
0:000
c ￿0:02
(￿0:46)
￿0:11￿
(￿2:20)
￿0:06￿
(￿2:17)
0:010
d ￿0:01
(￿0:18)
￿0:02
(￿0:46)
￿0:11￿
(￿2:21)
￿0:06￿
(￿2:14)
0:010
e ￿0:00
(￿0:57)
0:00
(0:82)
0:01
(1:75)
￿0:02
(￿0:55)
￿0:11￿
(￿2:20)
￿0:07￿
(￿2:40)
0:012
dy
(10 y)
t+1 a ￿0:07
(￿1:00)
0:000
b 0:00
(0:04)
0:00
(1:68)
￿0:02
(1:90)
0:003
c 0:03
(0:74)
￿0:06
(￿1:54)
￿0:11￿
(￿4:01)
0:013
d ￿0:19
(￿1:21)
0:02
(0:67)
￿0:06
(￿1:50)
￿0:10￿
(￿4:15)
0:013
e ￿0:00
(￿0:25)
0:00
(1:86)
￿0:01
(￿1:85)
0:03
(0:88)
￿0:06
(￿1:45)
￿0:11￿
(￿4:12)
0:016
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In-sample predictions of monthly yield changes (non-overlapping data)
The table displays the results of the in-sample predictions of yield changes
at the monthly horizon based on models a), b), c), d) and e) for the period
September 1999 to September 2005, where dy
(i y)
t+1 is the monthly yield change
of the i year bond , FSt is the forward spread, F1t;F2t and F3t are the ￿rst
three principal components of forward rates, and OFS
t , OFM
t and OFL
t are
short, medium and long order ￿ ow. Coe¢ cients are multiplied with 100 and
in bold when signi￿cant at the 10 percent level. * indicates signi￿cance at the
5 percent level or better.
40FSt F1t F2t F3t OFS
t OFM
t OFL
t Adj:R2
dy
(1 year)
t+1 a 11:2￿
(2:57)
0:090
b 0:00
(0:05)
0:05
(0:98)
0:16￿
(2:02)
0:000
c ￿0:30￿
(￿2:61)
￿0:22￿
(￿2:31)
0:12
(1:21)
0:167
d 6:58
(1:55)
￿0:24￿
(￿2:34)
￿0:20
(￿1:86)
0:07
(0:64)
0:182
e ￿0:01
(￿0:59)
0:01
(0:34)
0:24￿
(2:15)
￿0:33￿
(￿3:01)
￿0:22￿
(￿2:08)
0:11
(1:03)
0:184
dy
(2 years)
t+1 a 2:44
(0:82)
0:000
b ￿0:00
(￿0:34)
0:02
(0:43)
0:25￿
(2:29)
0:001
c ￿0:23￿
(￿2:12)
￿0:28￿
(￿2:12)
0:07
(0:70)
0:113
d 0:71
(0:26)
￿0:23￿
(￿2:07)
￿0:27￿
(￿2:04)
0:01
(0:59)
0:101
e ￿0:01
(￿0:99)
￿0:01
(￿0:23)
0:33￿
(2:34)
￿0:29￿
(￿2:45)
￿0:28￿
(￿1:99)
0:06
(0:56)
0:154
dy
(3 years)
t+1 a 0:57
(0:24)
0:000
b ￿0:01
(￿0:43)
0:02
(0:42)
0:28￿
(2:42)
0:012
c ￿0:18
(￿1:75)
￿0:28
(￿1:95)
0:04
(0:41)
0:085
d 0:01
(0:00)
￿0:18
(￿1:74)
￿0:28
(￿1:95)
0:04
(0:39)
0:072
e ￿0:01
(￿1:02)
￿0:01
(￿0:14)
0:35￿
(2:47)
￿0:24￿
(￿2:07)
￿0:28
(￿1:88)
0:02
(0:16)
0:137
dy
(4 years)
t+1 a ￿0:04
(￿0:02)
0:000
b ￿0:01
(￿0:42)
0:03
(0:55)
0:27￿
(2:53)
0:016
c ￿0:15
(￿1:48)
￿0:27
(￿1:90)
0:02
(0:22)
0:073
d ￿0:26
(￿0:14)
￿0:14
(￿1:49)
￿0:27
(￿1:94)
0:02
(0:24)
0:060
e ￿0:01
(￿0:92)
0:00
(0:07)
0:34￿
(2:61)
￿0:20
(￿1:81)
￿0:27
(￿1:84)
￿0:00
(￿0:05)
0:125
dy
(5 years)
t+1 a ￿0:35
(￿0:19)
0:000
b ￿0:00
(￿0:37)
0:03
(0:71)
0:25￿
(2:56)
0:014
c ￿0:12
(￿1:29)
￿0:26
(￿1:90)
0:01
(0:08)
0:069
d ￿0:44
(￿0:26)
￿0:12
(￿1:29)
￿0:27￿
(￿1:97)
0:01
(0:12)
0:057
e ￿0:01
(￿0:84)
0:01
(0:31)
0:31￿
(2:74)
￿0:17
(￿1:60)
￿0:26
(￿1:85)
￿0:02
(￿0:12)
0:115
dy
(10 years)
t+1 a ￿1:09
(￿0:69)
0:000
b ￿0:00
(￿0:26)
0:06
(1:60)
0:07
(0:90)
0:000
c ￿0:07
(￿0:72)
￿0:25
(￿1:85)
￿0:02
(￿0:29)
0:060
d ￿1:09
(￿0:71)
￿0:06
(￿0:67)
￿0:26￿
(￿2:00)
￿0:01
(￿0:14)
0:055
e ￿0:01
(￿0:62)
0:05
(1:61)
0:11
(1:76)
￿0:09
(￿0:86)
￿0:23
(￿1:69)
￿0:06
(￿0:61)
0:054
41Table 5
Out-of-Sample predictions of daily yield changes
The table compares the out-of-sample predictive power of models based on
order ￿ ow and models based on forward rates to the random walk (RW) for
the period September 2000 to September 2005. Only variables that are sig-
ni￿cant in-sample are included in the alternative models. The second column
lists the variables included in the alternative model. The third column displays
the ratio of the mean squared errors of the alternative models, MSEU, over
that of the RW, MSER. A ratio less than one indicates that the alternative
model outperforms the RW. To test whether the MSE of the model is signif-
icantly smaller than the MSE of the RW, the McCracken (2007) MSE-F test
is employed. The value of the McCracken test statistic is displayed in the
fourth column. Values in bold indicates a signi￿cance level of 10 percent, and
* indicates signi￿cance at the 5 percent level or better. The forecasts are based
on recursive estimation.
Alt. model vs RW MSEU=MSER Test statistic
dy
(1Y )
t+1 OFS;OFM 0.975 33.14*
dy
(2Y )
t+1 OFS;OFM 0.982 21.88*
dy
(3Y )
t+1 OFM 0.990 12.53*
dy
(4Y )
t+1 OFM;OFL 0.991 11.75*
dy
(5Y )
t+1 OFM;OFL 0.989 11.12*
dy
(10Y )
t+1 OFL 0.986 16.45*
F2;F3 1.000 2.57*
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Out-of-Sample predictions of monthly yield changes
The table compares the out-of-sample predictive power of models based on
order ￿ ow and models based on forward rates to the random walk (RW) for
the period September 2001 to September 2005. Only variables that are sig-
ni￿cant in-sample are included in the alternative models. The second column
lists the variables included in the alternative model. The third column displays
the ratio of the mean squared errors of the alternative models, MSEU, over
that of the RW, MSER. A ratio less than one indicates that the alternative
model outperforms the RW. To test whether the MSE of the model is signif-
icantly smaller than the MSE of the RW, the McCracken (2007) MSE-F test
is employed. The value of the McCracken test statistic is displayed in the
fourth column. Values in bold indicates a signi￿cance level of 10 percent, and
* indicates signi￿cance at the 5 percent level or better. The forecasts are based
on recursive estimation.
Alt. model vs RW MSEU=MSER Test statistic
dy
(1Y )
t+1 OFS, OFM 0.874 7.66*
F3 0.995 0.30
dy
(2Y )
t+1 OFS, OFM 0.900 5.92*
F3 0.967 1.86
dy
(3Y )
t+1 OFS, OFM 0.925 4.34*
F3 0.954 2.54*
dy
(4Y )
t+1 OFM 0.925 4.29*
F3 0.952 2.66*
dy
(5Y )
t+1 OFM 0.928 4.15*
F3 0.956 2.43*
dy
(10Y )
t+1 OFM 0.934 3.76*
F3 0.998 0.03
43Table 7
Individual Dealers
Panel A: Dealer characteristics
The table describes the seven dealers who were active in the government
bond market during the period 1999 to 2005. They are characterized by size,
customer base, dealer activity and the impact of their order ￿ ow in predicting
yield changes. Size is measured as total market share, calculated as the gross
value of customer trades and initiated interdealer trades by the dealer as a
percentage of the total value of both markets combined. Customer base is
measured as the market share in the customer market, calculated as dealer
gross value of customer trades as a percentage of total customer trades. Dealer
activity is measured as the value of a dealer￿ s initiated interdealer trades over
the value of her customer trades.
Value of trades in Norwegian kroner
Dealer Size Customer base Dealer activity
Total Customer Interdealer trades
market share market share Customer trades
1 24 % 24 % 31
2 23 % 25 % 19
3 21 % 19 % 42
4 17 % 18 % 28
5 9 % 9 % 33
6 4 % 4 % 30
7 2 % 1 % 435
44Panel B: Composition of dealer trades
The table shows the composition of trades for each of the seven dealers
during the period 1999 to 2005. The number of trades entered into by each
dealer are divided into interdealer trades and customer trades. Interdealer
trades are divided into active trades, which are trades initiated by the dealer,
and passive trades, which are trades initiated by other dealers. The ￿rst column
shows the number of active (initiated) interdealer trades as a percentage of the
total number of interdealer and customer trades by each dealer. The second
column shows the number of passive interdealer trades as a percentage of the
total number of interdealer and customer trades by each dealer. The third
column shows the number of customer trades as a percentage of the total
number of interdealer and customer trades by each dealer.
Number of trades as a percentage
of total number of trades for each dealer
Dealer Interdealer trades Customer trades
Active Passive All
1 24 % 20 % 56 %
2 15 % 23 % 62 %
3 28 % 27 % 45 %
4 22 % 23 % 55 %
5 34 % 23 % 43 %
6 27 % 28 % 45 %
7 55 % 36 % 9 %
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In-sample predictions of daily 1 - 3 year yield changes at dealer level
The table displays the predictive power of the order ￿ ow of individual dealers
over the period September 1999 to September 2005. The table presents the results of
regressing yield changes on day t+1 on day t short term, medium term and long term
order ￿ ow of dealer i in the interdealer market (OF) and the customer market (COF).
The regressions also include a constant and the three ￿rst forward rate factors at time
t, but the coe¢ cients are not included in the table. Coe¢ cients are to the e￿04 and
in bold when signi￿cant at the 10 percent level and starred when signi￿cant at the 5
percent level or better. T-values in parenthesis.
Dealer OFS
i;t OFM
i;t OFL
i;t COFS
i;t COFM
i;t COFL
i;t Adj:R2
dy
1y
t+1 1 ￿0:23￿
(￿2:40)
￿0:48￿
(￿2:85)
￿0:08
(￿1:06)
￿0:02
(￿0:23)
￿0:13
(￿1:35)
￿0:01
(￿0:08)
0:022
2 ￿0:07
(￿0:47)
￿0:12
(￿1:46)
￿0:09
(￿1:03)
￿0:18￿
(￿2:88)
0:08
(1:50)
0:02
(0:35)
0:006
3 ￿0:11
(￿0:75)
￿0:12
(￿1:42)
￿0:06
(￿0:84)
￿0:06
(￿0:77)
￿0:16
(￿1:80)
￿0:02
(￿0:21)
0:004
4 ￿0:06
(￿0:63)
￿0:17
(￿1:75)
￿0:20￿
(￿2:30)
￿0:04
(￿0:51)
0:02
(0:36)
0:04
(0:37)
0:004
5 ￿0:13
(￿1:24)
￿0:16￿
(￿2:02)
￿0:11
(￿0:78)
0:05
(0:38)
￿0:14
(￿0:89)
0:13
(1:22)
0:005
6 ￿0:24
(￿1:29)
￿0:13
(￿0:63)
￿0:22
(￿1:19)
0:06
(0:33)
0:09
(0:46)
0:28
(1:61)
0:003
7 ￿0:05
(￿0:79)
￿0:07
(￿1:03)
￿0:09
(￿1:41)
￿0:07
(￿0:27)
0:21
(0:87)
0:33
(1:16)
0:001
dy
2y
t+1 1 ￿0:26￿
(￿2:64)
￿0:53￿
(￿3:22)
￿0:07
(￿0:74)
0:02
(0:15)
￿0:20
(￿1:75)
￿0:05
(￿0:60)
0:019
2 ￿0:15
(￿0:89)
￿0:07
(￿0:59)
￿0:11
(￿0:95)
￿0:15￿
(￿2:00)
0:06
(0:85)
￿0:01
(￿0:08)
0:001
3 ￿0:06
(￿0:32)
￿0:14
(￿1:27)
￿0:02
(￿0:30)
￿0:09
(￿0:86)
￿0:19
(￿1:84)
￿0:00
(0:04)
0:000
4 ￿0:11
(￿0:79)
￿0:17
(￿1:52)
￿0:28￿
(￿2:91)
0:03
(0:34)
￿0:02
(￿0:22)
0:01
(0:10)
0:004
5 ￿0:22
(￿1:73)
￿0:18￿
(￿1:89)
￿0:12
(￿0:64)
0:04
(0:26)
￿0:21
(￿1:36)
0:14
(1:10)
0:004
6 ￿0:06
(￿0:27)
￿0:10
(￿0:52)
￿0:11
(￿0:55)
￿0:08
(￿0:29)
0:03
(0:11)
0:26
(1:33)
0:000
7 0:00
(0:08)
0:02
(0:25)
￿0:12
(￿1:57)
￿0:11
(￿0:32)
0:24
(0:94)
0:40
(1:02)
0:000
dy
3y
t+1 1 ￿0:24￿
(￿2:37)
￿0:48￿
(￿3:49)
￿0:08
(￿0:79)
0:07
(0:57)
￿0:24￿
(￿2:04)
￿0:06
(￿0:67)
0:017
2 ￿0:15
(￿0:96)
￿0:06
(￿0:45)
￿0:07
(￿0:65)
￿0:09
(￿1:21)
0:06
(0:77)
￿0:01
(￿0:13)
0:000
3 ￿0:01
(￿0:04)
￿0:15
(￿1:32)
￿0:01
(￿0:08)
￿0:09
(￿0:89)
￿0:18
(￿1:65)
0:01
(0:14)
0:000
4 ￿0:11
(￿0:79)
￿0:17
(￿1:50)
￿0:29￿
(￿3:11)
0:07
(0:99)
￿0:06
(￿0:60)
0:02
(0:21)
0:005
5 ￿0:20
(￿1:70)
￿0:20￿
(￿2:01)
￿0:11
(￿0:55)
0:03
(0:20)
￿0:20
(￿1:31)
0:08
(0:63)
0:004
6 0:02
(0:08)
￿0:10
(￿0:58)
￿0:01
(￿0:07)
￿0:22
(￿0:61)
￿0:04
(￿0:15)
0:17
(1:03)
0:000
7 0:02
(0:23)
0:06
(0:78)
￿0:12
(￿1:35)
￿0:09
(￿0:24)
0:20
(0:82)
0:30
(0:69)
0:000
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In-sample predictions of daily 4, 5 and 10 year yield changes at dealer level
The table displays the predictive power of the order ￿ ow of individual dealers
over the period September 1999 to September 2005. The table presents the results
of regressing yield changes on day t+1 on day t short term, medium term and long
term order ￿ ow of dealer i. The regressions also include a constant and the three
￿rst forward rate factors at time t, but the coe¢ cients are not included in the table.
Coe¢ cients are to the e￿04 and in bold when signi￿cant at the 10 percent level and
starred when signi￿cant at the 5 percent level or better.
Dealer OFS
i;t OFM
i;t OFL
i;t COFS
i;t COFM
i;t COFL
i;t Adj:R2
dy
4y
t+1 1 ￿0:21￿
(￿2:02)
￿0:42￿
(￿3:33)
￿0:10
(￿0:94)
0:10
(0:91)
￿0:25￿
(￿2:19)
￿0:07
(￿0:77)
0:016
2 ￿0:15
(￿1:01)
￿0:07
(￿0:49)
￿0:06
(￿0:52)
￿0:05
(￿0:72)
0:07
(0:89)
￿0:02
(￿0:29)
0:000
3 0:03
(0:23)
￿0:14
(￿1:39)
￿0:01
(￿0:13)
￿0:09
(￿0:87)
￿0:16
(￿1:53)
0:03
(0:31)
0:001
4 ￿0:08
(￿0:61)
￿0:17
(￿1:51)
￿0:28￿
(￿3:12)
0:09
(1:21)
￿0:07
(￿0:73)
0:04
(0:33)
0:007
5 ￿0:17
(￿1:56)
￿0:20￿
(￿1:96)
￿0:09
(￿0:49)
0:04
(0:24)
￿0:17
(￿1:18)
0:02
(0:19)
0:004
6 0:07
(0:30)
￿0:10
(￿0:68)
0:07
(0:37)
￿0:20
(￿0:63)
￿0:00
(￿0:01)
0:10
(0:69)
0:000
7 0:02
(0:23)
0:09
(1:17)
￿0:11
(￿1:32)
￿0:02
(￿0:06)
0:18
(0:77)
0:27
(0:61)
0:000
dy
5y
t+1 1 ￿0:18
(￿1:76)
￿0:37￿
(￿3:04)
￿0:10
(￿1:12)
0:12
(1:20)
￿0:23￿
(￿2:21)
￿0:08
(￿0:93)
0:014
2 ￿0:15
(￿1:09)
￿0:08
(￿0:57)
￿0:06
(￿0:54)
￿0:03
(￿0:40)
0:08
(1:08)
￿0:03
(￿0:45)
0:000
3 0:07
(0:51)
￿0:14
(￿1:56)
￿0:02
(￿0:31)
￿0:08
(￿0:82)
￿0:15
(￿1:48)
0:04
(0:46)
0:001
4 ￿0:05
(￿0:35)
￿0:16
(￿1:51)
￿0:28￿
(￿3:19)
0:08
(1:21)
￿0:07
(￿0:73)
0:04
(0:39)
0:006
5 ￿0:15
(￿1:44)
￿0:19
(￿1:76)
￿0:07
(￿0:44)
0:05
(0:35)
￿0:15
(￿1:07)
￿0:02
(￿0:14)
0:003
6 0:10
(0:50)
￿0:10
(￿0:79)
0:13
(0:78)
￿0:21
(￿0:71)
0:01
(0:05)
0:05
(0:40)
0:000
7 0:02
(0:19)
0:11
(1:46)
￿0:12
(￿1:43)
0:05
(0:16)
0:19
(0:79)
0:33
(0:76)
0:001
dy
10y
t+1 1 ￿0:12
(￿1:11)
￿0:18
(￿1:51)
￿0:16
(￿1:62)
0:15
(1:90)
￿0:11
(￿1:12)
￿0:13
(￿1:78)
0:013
2 ￿0:21
(￿1:42)
￿0:06
(￿0:50)
￿1:02
(￿0:64)
0:01
(0:23)
￿0:09
(￿1:29)
￿0:05
(￿0:78)
0:007
3 0:15
(1:59)
￿0:14
(￿1:63)
￿0:07
(￿0:91)
￿0:05
(￿0:57)
￿0:12
(￿1:34)
0:09
(1:00)
0:007
4 0:10
(0:68)
￿0:19
(￿0:71)
￿0:32￿
(￿3:95)
0:03
(0:47)
￿0:02
(￿0:29)
0:02
(0:19)
0:012
5 ￿0:12
(￿1:21)
￿0:10
(￿0:79)
￿0:02
(￿0:18)
0:12
(0:82)
￿0:07
(￿0:51)
￿0:06
(￿0:58)
0:003
6 0:24
(1:18)
￿0:09
(￿0:71)
0:27
(1:81)
￿0:20
(￿0:95)
0:10
(0:57)
￿0:04
(￿0:34)
0:004
7 0:02
(0:16)
0:11
(1:80)
￿0:16
(￿1:88)
0:25
(0:81)
0:23
(0:85)
0:91￿
(2:00)
0:012
47Table 10
In-sample predictions of monthly 1- 3 year yield changes at dealer level
The table presents the results of regressing yield changes on month t+1 on the short
term, medium term and long term order ￿ ow of dealer i over the period September 1999
to September 2005. The regressions also include a constant and the three ￿rst forward
rate factors at time t, but the coe¢ cients are not included in the table. Coe¢ cients
are to the e￿04and in bold when signi￿cant at the 10 percent level and starred when
signi￿cant at the 5 percent level or better.
Dealer OFS
i;t OFM
i;t OFL
i;t COFS
i;t COFM
i;t COFL
i;t Adj:R2
dy
1y
t+1 1 ￿0:67￿
(￿2:28)
￿1:43￿
(￿2:56)
￿0:38
(￿0:83)
0:32
(1:36)
￿0:39
(￿0:85)
0:23
(0:70)
0:095
2 ￿0:68
(￿1:77)
1:19
(1:48)
0:47
(1:04)
0:16
(0:43)
￿0:90￿
(￿3:09)
￿0:05
(￿0:26)
0:045
3 ￿0:24
(￿0:86)
￿1:37￿
(￿3:44)
￿0:29
(￿0:74)
￿0:67
(￿1:66)
￿0:00
(￿0:00)
￿0:23
(￿0:71)
0:091
4 ￿1:20￿
(￿2:75)
￿0:01
(￿0:21)
0:25
(0:57)
0:11
(0:30)
0:11
(0:32)
0:08
(0:12)
0:019
5 ￿0:28
(￿1:32)
￿0:64
(￿1:68)
￿0:19
(￿0:26)
0:45
(0:50)
￿0:19
(￿0:42)
￿0:25
(￿0:45)
0:000
6 ￿0:36
(￿0:42)
￿1:62
(￿1:89)
￿0:08
(￿0:07)
￿0:15
(￿0:13)
0:45
(0:57)
0:96
(0:84)
0:000
7 ￿0:12
(￿0:42)
0:07
(0:14)
0:06
(0:36)
0:22
(0:10)
￿0:68
(￿0:39)
￿1:10
(0:47)
0:000
dy
2y
t+1 1 ￿0:77￿
(￿1:99)
￿1:47￿
(￿2:22)
￿0:13
(￿0:34)
0:56
(1:78)
￿0:51
(￿0:95)
0:13
(0:55)
0:099
2 ￿0:86￿
(￿2:08)
0:64
(0:71)
0:71
(1:34)
0:12
(0:36)
￿0:78￿
(￿2:89)
￿0:10
(￿0:37)
0:036
3 ￿0:52
(￿1:49)
￿1:32￿
(￿2:86)
￿0:15
(￿0:42)
￿0:57
(￿1:51)
0:09
(0:21)
￿0:46
(￿1:16)
0:093
4 ￿1:36￿
(￿2:66)
￿0:19
(￿0:35)
0:00
(0:01)
0:22
(0:70)
0:15
(0:45)
￿0:27
(￿0:39)
0:000
5 ￿0:48
(￿1:79)
￿0:26
(￿0:61)
￿0:40
(￿0:52)
￿0:04
(￿0:05)
￿0:19
(￿0:40)
￿0:54
(￿0:95)
0:009
6 ￿0:41
(￿0:45)
￿1:54
(￿1:82)
0:34
(0:27)
￿0:14
(￿0:10)
0:76
(0:96)
0:22
(0:19)
0:000
7 0:18
(0:52)
￿0:02
(￿0:04)
0:01
(0:04)
￿1:08
(￿0:46)
￿0:22
(￿0:13)
￿1:24
(￿0:51)
0:000
dy
3y
t+1 1 ￿0:78￿
(￿1:99)
￿1:34￿
(￿2:03)
0:00
(0:05)
0:72￿
(2:12)
￿0:62
(￿1:14)
0:08
(0:43)
0:113
2 ￿0:93￿
(￿2:21)
0:18
(0:21)
0:80
(1:55)
0:05
(0:18)
￿0:66￿
(￿2:74)
￿0:11
(￿0:35)
0:055
3 ￿0:62
(￿1:58)
￿1:09￿
(￿2:24)
￿0:06
(￿0:18)
￿0:43
(￿1:21)
0:03
(0:06)
￿0:55
(￿1:42)
0:090
4 ￿1:38￿
(￿2:88)
￿0:14
(￿0:26)
￿0:07
(￿0:17)
0:23
(0:81)
0:15
(0:51)
￿0:50
(￿0:80)
0:027
5 ￿0:54
(￿1:65)
￿0:06
(￿0:13)
￿0:44
(￿0:63)
￿0:19
(￿0:20)
￿0:33
(￿0:69)
￿0:63
(￿1:20)
0:032
6 ￿0:22
(￿0:25)
￿1:49
(￿1:85)
0:81
(0:67)
￿0:04
(￿0:03)
0:80
(1:00)
￿0:29
(￿0:25)
0:000
7 0:33
(0:95)
0:01
(0:03)
￿0:03
(￿0:12)
￿1:88
(￿0:88)
0:32
(0:20)
￿1:07
(￿0:47)
0:000
48Table 11
In-sample predictions of monthly 4, 5 and 10 year yield changes at dealer
level
The table presents the results of regressing yield changes on month t+1 on the short
term, medium term and long term order ￿ ow of dealer i over the period September 1999
to September 2005. The regressions also include a constant and the three ￿rst forward
rate factors at time t, but the coe¢ cients are not included in the table. Coe¢ cients
are to the e￿04and in bold when signi￿cant at the 10 percent level and starred when
signi￿cant at the 5 percent level or better.
Dealer OFS
i;t OFM
i;t OFL
i;t COFS
i;t COFM
i;t COFL
i;t Adj:R2
dy
4y
t+1 1 ￿0:77￿
(￿2:09)
￿1:20
(￿1:90)
0:10
(0:36)
0:80￿
(2:38)
￿0:67
(￿1:28)
0:03
(0:18)
0:125
2 ￿0:94￿
(￿2:25)
￿0:09
(￿0:10)
0:80
(1:65)
0:03
(0:10)
￿0:58￿
(￿2:72)
￿0:11
(￿0:36)
0:070
3 ￿0:64
(￿1:53)
￿0:87
(￿1:77)
￿0:00
(￿0:01)
￿0:32
(￿0:89)
￿0:05
(￿0:10)
￿0:59
(￿1:61)
0:081
4 ￿1:34￿
(￿3:11)
￿0:04
(￿0:08)
￿0:12
(￿0:30)
0:19
(0:72)
0:15
(0:56)
￿0:62
(￿1:10)
0:044
5 ￿0:54
(￿1:47)
0:02
(0:05)
￿0:43
(￿0:70)
￿0:19
(￿0:22)
￿0:50
(￿1:06)
￿0:61
(￿1:28)
0:040
6 ￿0:02
(￿0:03)
￿1:49￿
(￿1:97)
1:06
(0:95)
￿0:02
(￿0:02)
0:73
(0:90)
￿0:54
(￿0:47)
0:000
7 0:39
(1:11)
0:02
(0:04)
￿0:07
(￿0:22)
￿2:21
(￿1:16)
0:91
(0:65)
￿0:88
(￿0:42)
0:000
dy
5y
t+1 1 ￿0:76￿
(￿2:20)
￿1:07
(￿1:81)
0:14
(0:58)
0:83￿
(2:56)
￿0:69
(￿1:38)
￿0:02
(￿0:12)
0:133
2 ￿0:92￿
(￿2:25)
￿0:23
(￿0:30)
0:75
(1:67)
0:03
(0:13)
￿0:53￿
(￿2:80)
￿0:12
(￿0:39)
0:076
3 ￿0:63
(￿1:49)
￿0:71
(￿1:42)
0:03
(0:12)
￿0:22
(￿0:61)
￿0:12
(￿0:22)
￿0:59
(￿1:76)
0:070
4 ￿1:29￿
(￿3:26)
0:05
(0:10)
￿0:16
(￿0:44)
0:13
(0:56)
0:15
(0:59)
￿0:65
(￿1:33)
0:051
5 ￿0:51
(￿1:32)
0:05
(0:11)
￿0:41
(￿0:75)
￿0:15
(￿0:18)
￿0:66
(￿1:40)
￿0:55
(￿1:27)
0:040
6 0:13
(0:17)
￿1:51￿
(￿2:12)
1:30
(1:17)
￿0:05
(￿0:04)
0:62
(0:74)
￿0:64
(￿0:58)
0:000
7 0:40
(1:15)
￿0:00
(￿0:00)
￿0:10
(￿0:30)
￿2:26
(￿1:33)
1:46
(1:16)
￿0:74
(￿0:39)
0:000
dy
10y
t+1 1 ￿0:73￿
(￿2:38)
￿0:65
(￿1:33)
0:26
(0:96)
0:83￿
(2:74)
￿0:68
(￿1:44)
￿0:21
(￿0:99)
0:108
2 ￿0:80￿
(￿1:97)
￿0:43
(￿0:78)
0:47
(1:29)
0:08
(0:39)
￿0:37￿
(￿2:52)
￿0:20
(￿0:74)
0:036
3 ￿0:54
(￿1:33)
￿0:27
(￿0:51)
0:09
(0:31)
0:03
(0:09)
￿0:19
(￿0:36)
￿0:60￿
(￿2:23)
0:011
4 ￿1:14￿
(￿3:25)
0:28
(0:57)
￿0:26
(￿0:80)
0:01
(0:06)
0:10
(0:43)
￿0:61￿
(￿2:31)
0:046
5 ￿0:31
(￿0:75)
￿0:04
(￿0:09)
￿0:29
(￿0:89)
0:01
(0:02)
￿1:04￿
(￿2:06)
￿0:42
(￿1:20)
0:014
6 0:42
(0:72)
￿1:42￿
(￿2:41)
1:51
(1:58)
￿0:10
(￿0:10)
0:14
(0:14)
￿0:88
(￿0:89)
0:000
7 0:34
(1:03)
￿0:10
(￿0:29)
￿0:18
(￿0:55)
2:26
(1:64)
2:90￿
(2:95)
￿0:58
(￿0:33)
0:047
49Table 12
Out-of-Sample predictions of daily yield changes at dealer level
The table compares the predictive power of alternative order ￿ ow models
to the random walk (RW) over the period September 2000 to September 2005.
Only variables that are signi￿cant in-sample are included in the alternative
models. The ￿rst column indicates the maturity of the yield changes. The
second column lists the variables included in the alternative interdealer order
￿ ow model. The third column displays the ratio of the mean squared errors of
the alternative models, MSEU, over that of the RW, MSER. A ratio less than
one indicates that the alternative model outperforms the RW. To test whether
the MSE of the model is signi￿cantly smaller than the MSE of the RW, the
McCracken (2007) MSE-F test is employed. The value of the McCracken test
statistic is displayed in the fourth column. The last three columns reports the
corresponding data for the alternative customer order ￿ ow model. Values in
bold indicates a signi￿cance level of 10 percent, and * indicates signi￿cance at
the 5 percent level or better. The forecasts are based on recursive estimation.
Maturity Dealer Alt. model MSEU
MSER Test stat. Alt. model MSEU
MSER Test stat.
dy
(1Y )
t+1 1 OFS;OFM 0.978 27.91￿
2 COFS 0.995 6.29￿
3 COFM 1.000 2.09￿
4 OFM;OFL 1.000 4.56￿
5 OFM 1.000 4.03￿
dy
(2Y )
t+1 1 OFS;OFM 0.981 24.56￿ COFM 0.996 3.94￿
2 COFS 1.000 1.61￿
3 COFM 1.000 1.82￿
4 OFL 0.996 7.10￿
5 OFS;OFM 0.996 6.79*
dy
(3Y )
t+1 1 OFS;OFM 0.985 18.69￿ COFM 0.996 5.25￿
3 COFM 1.000 1.16
4 OFL 0.996 7.09￿
5 OFS;OFM 0.996 6.26*
dy
(4Y )
t+1 1 OFS;OFM 0.988 14.36￿ COFM 0.996 5.52￿
4 OFL 0.992 6.97￿
5 OFM 0.996 4.23*
dy
(5Y )
t+1 1 OFS;OFM 0.991 11.37￿ COFM 0.996 5.19￿
4 OFL 0.996 7.57￿
5 OFM 0.996 4.20*
dy
(10Y )
t+1 1 OFL 1.000 2.25￿ COFS;COFL 1.000 0.83
3 OFM 1.000 0.29
4 OFL 0.989 13.23￿
7 OFM;OFL 1.005 -3.88
50Table 13
Out-of-Sample predictions of monthly yield changes at dealer level
The table compares the predictive power of alternative order ￿ ow models
to the random walk (RW) over the period September 2001 to September 2005.
Only variables that are signi￿cant in-sample are included in the alternative
models. The ￿rst column indicates the maturity of the yield changes. The
second column lists the variables included in the alternative interdealer order
￿ ow model. The third column displays the ratio of the mean squared errors of
the alternative models, MSEU, over that of the RW, MSER. A ratio less than
one indicates that the alternative model outperforms the RW. To test whether
the MSE of the model is signi￿cantly smaller than the MSE of the RW, the
McCracken (2007) MSE-F test is employed. The value of the McCracken test
statistic is displayed in the fourth column. The last three columns reports the
corresponding data for the alternative customer order ￿ ow model. Values in
bold indicates a signi￿cance level of 10 percent, and * indicates signi￿cance at
the 5 percent level or better. The forecasts are based on recursive estimation.
51Maturity Dealer Alt. model MSEU
MSER Test stat. Alt. model MSEU
MSER Test stat.
dy
(1Y )
t+1 1 OFS;OFM 0.885 6.77￿ COFS 1.020 -1.010
2 OFS 1.073 -3.54 COFM 0.958 2.31￿
3 OFM 0.890 6.44￿ COFS 1.007 -0.35
4 OFS 0.962 1.58￿
dy
(2Y )
t+1 1 OFS;OFM 0.906 5.39￿ COFS 1.025 -1.25
2 OFS 1.054 -2.67 COFM 0.975 1.33
3 OFM 0.911 5.05￿
4 OFS 0.960 2.17￿
5 OFS 0.959 2.25￿
dy
(3Y )
t+1 1 OFS;OFM 0.918 4.68￿ COFS 1.026 -1.30
2 OFS 1.028 -1.39 COFM 0.981 1.00
3 OFM 0.941 3.26￿
4 OFS 0.957 2.31￿
5 OFS 0.958 2.26￿
dy
(4Y )
t+1 1 OFS;OFM 0.923 4.29￿ COFS 1.025 -1.27
2 OFS 1.011 -0.56 COFM 0.984 0.84
3 OFM 0.963 2.02￿
4 OFS 0.955 2.42￿
5 OFS 0.961 2.11￿
dy
(5Y )
t+1 1 OFS;OFM 0.928 4.04￿ COFS 1.025 -1.28
2 OFS 1.004 -0.23 COFM 0.986 0.76
3 COFL 1.005 -0.28
4 OFS 0.953 2.54￿
dy
(10Y )
t+1 1 OFS 1.000 0.04 COFS 1.031 -1.54
2 OFS 1.031 -1.55 COFM 0.996 0.19
3 COFL 0.994 0.31
4 OFS 0.938 3.44￿ COFL 0.970 1.63￿
52Figure 1: Predicting out-of-sample daily 2 year yield changes using short and medium
term aggregate order ￿ ow. The curve illustrates the cumulative squared prediction errors
of the random walk model minus the squared prediction errors of the order ￿ ow model
over the period September 2000 to September 2005. The di⁄erence in prediction errors
is measured along the vertical axis and the time period is measured along the horizontal
axis. In periods when the curve increases, the order ￿ ow model predicts better, in periods
when it decreases, the random walk give the best predictions.
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53Figure 2: Predicting out-of-sample monthly 2 year yield changes using monthly short term
aggregate interdealer order ￿ ow and the third principal component of forward rates. The
curves illustrate the cumulative squared prediction errors of the random walk model minus
the squared prediction errors of the alternative models, the order ￿ ow model (solid line)
and the term structure model (dotted line), over the period September 2001 to September
2005. The di⁄erence in prediction errors is measured along the vertical axis and the time
period is measured along the horizontal axis. In periods when the curves increase, the
alternative model predicts better, in periods when it decreases, the random walk give the
best predictions.
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54Figure 3: Predicting daily 3 year yield changes using the short and medium term inter-
dealer order ￿ ow of Dealer 1 and the medium term customer order ￿ ow of Dealer 1. The
curves illustrate the cumulative squared prediction errors of the random walk model minus
the squared prediction errors of the alternative models, the interdealer order ￿ ow model
(solid line) and the customer order ￿ ow model (dotted line), over the period September
2000 to September 2005. The di⁄erence in prediction errors is measured along the vertical
axis and the time period is measured along the horizontal axis. In periods when a curve
increases, the order ￿ ow model predicts better. In periods when it decreases the random
walk model gives the best predictions.
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55Figure 4: Predicting daily 3 year yield changes using the long term interdealer order ￿ ow
of Dealer 4 and the long term customer order ￿ ow of Dealer 4. The curves illustrate
the cumulative squared prediction errors of the random walk model minus the squared
prediction errors of the alternative models, the interdealer order ￿ ow model (solid line) and
the customer order ￿ ow model (dotted line), over the period September 2000 to September
2005. The di⁄erence in prediction errors is measured along the vertical axis and the time
period is measured along the horizontal axis. In periods when a curve increases, the order
￿ ow model predicts better. In periods when it decreases the random walk model gives the
best predictions.
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56Figure 5: Predicting out-of-sample daily 3 year yield changes using the short and medium
term interdealer order ￿ ow of Dealer 1 and Dealer 2. The curves illustrate the cumulative
squared prediction errors of the random walk minus the squared prediction errors of each
interdealer order ￿ ow model (solid line for Dealer 1 and dotted line for Dealer 2) over
the period September 2000 to September 2005. The di⁄erence in prediction errors is
measured along the vertical axis and the time period is measured along the horizontal
axis. In periods when a curve increases, the order ￿ ow model predicts better. In periods
when it decreases the random walk model gives the best predictions.
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